

## **Synergy Between TNI And Polri In Preventing Radicalism To Achieve National Stability (Case Study In Korem 074/Warastratama)**

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### **Abstract**

*Radicalism is a significant threat to national stability that requires special attention from various state security elements, including the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri). This study aims to analyse the synergy between TNI and Polri in their efforts to prevent radicalism in the Korem 074/Warastratama region. Using a descriptive qualitative approach, the research explores how coordination, communication, and collaboration between these two institutions contribute to mitigating radical threats in the area. Data was collected through in-depth interviews, field observations, and document analysis, and then analysed using a triangulation method. The findings indicate that the synergy established between TNI and Polri in the Korem 074/Warastratama region has been effective in suppressing the spread of radical ideologies. However, challenges such as policy differences, sectoral egos, and technical coordination issues need to be addressed to further enhance the effectiveness of this collaboration. This study is expected to contribute to strengthening national security policies by improving inter-agency synergy to safeguard national stability from the threat of radicalism.*

**Keywords: Synergy, TNI-Polri, Radicalism, National Stability, Korem 074/Warastratama**

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## **INTRODUCTION**

The development of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia shows a dynamic and complex pattern. The evolution of radical groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT), and Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) marks a change in the structure, strategy, and ideology of extremist movements in the country. JI, founded by Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Ba'asyir in 1993, aimed to establish an Islamic state in Southeast Asia and gained widespread notoriety through the 2002 Bali Bombings (Syeirazi, 2018). As JI's structure weakened due to the deaths of its leaders and the arrest of key figures, JAT emerged in 2008 and JAD in 2014, both more closely affiliated with the global ISIS network, employing lone wolf tactics and suicide attacks (Rottenberg, 2012; Hamidin, 2018).

The radicalism underlying these terrorist acts poses a real challenge to national security. As defined by Dedi Prasetyo (2020), radicalism is an extreme ideology that rejects national and democratic values and tends to replace the existing system through violence, relying on ideological justification. This phenomenon has spread through propaganda, social inequality, and transnational doctrines disseminated via social media.

This situation is a serious concern for a country governed by the rule of law such as Indonesia, which considers national security to be part of its constitutional objectives based on the 1945 Constitution and Pancasila. Article 30 of the 1945 Constitution emphasizes the importance of the universal security defense system (Sishankamrata), which integrates the roles of the TNI and Polri in maintaining the sovereignty and security of the community from threats both from within and outside the country.

In terms of implementation, the National Police, through the Anti-Terrorism Unit (Densus 88), plays a central role in enforcing the law against terrorism perpetrators, as stipulated in Law No. 2 of 2002. On the other hand, the TNI is given a supporting role based on Law No.

34 of 2004, and further clarified in Law No. 5 of 2018 on the Eradication of Terrorism, particularly in conditions that require military action or when the Polri is not sufficiently effective (Law No. 5/2018, Articles 3 and 7).

One of the areas that has become a center of radicalism is Solo and its surroundings, which fall under the jurisdiction of the 074/Warastratama Military Command. A number of terrorist incidents in this region, such as the 2016 Thamrin Bombing, the Surakarta Police Station Bombing, and various terrorist arrests in Karanganyar, Boyolali, and Sukoharjo, indicate that Solo is a “hotspot” for the spread of radicalism (Hamidin, 2018; DetikNews, 2024). This situation is influenced by historical factors (JI roots), a supportive social environment (Islamic boarding schools, jihad literature, radical Islamic organizations), and the presence of radical figures residing there.

Although laws have regulated cooperation between the TNI and Polri, their synergy in the field still faces obstacles. Research shows that information exchange is not yet optimal, there are differences in intelligence data, and a lack of joint training has caused operational gaps in addressing the threat of radicalism in the Korem 074/Warastratama region (Nijayati & Rahmat, 2011). However, a collaborative approach—involving effective communication, inter-agency trust, and operational cooperation—can significantly strengthen efforts to prevent radicalism.

From a strategic perspective, the TNI plays a crucial role in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW), which encompass intelligence, prevention, enforcement, and post-terrorism recovery functions. TNI intelligence is expected to synergize with police intelligence and other agencies to enable comprehensive early detection of potential threats. The TNI's logistical and technical support is also crucial in large-scale operations involving conflict-prone areas (Law No. 34/2004, Article 7).

From a theoretical perspective, national security is a multidimensional concept that encompasses not only the military but also social, economic, and ideological aspects, as explained by Connie R. Bakrie (2015). Therefore, preventing radicalism is not enough with a repressive approach, but also requires deradicalization through education, dialogue, and ideological counter-narratives (Prasetyo, 2020).

SWOT analysis also provides a strategic mapping of the roles of the TNI and Polri:

- Strengths: The TNI has a strong command structure and territorial proximity (Babinsa), while the Polri excels in law enforcement and specialized intelligence networks.
- Weaknesses: There is sectoral egoism and overlapping authority in handling radicalism.
- Opportunities: Community support and regulatory strengthening through Law No. 5 of 2018 open up opportunities for better synergy.
- Threats: The spread of radical ideology through digital media and transnational organizations continues to grow and is difficult to monitor (SWOT Analysis, 2024).

To achieve national stability, synergy between the TNI and Polri is not an option, but a necessity. President Joko Widodo emphasized in the TNI-Polri Executive Meeting (February 2024) that future challenges, such as radicalism and terrorist threats, must be addressed through solidarity, integration, and rapid inter-agency coordination. In the context of Korem 074/Warastratama, the following actions are necessary:

1. Enhancing cross-institutional communication capacity (intelligence, operational, and logistics).
2. Conducting joint exercises and integrating real-time security information systems.
3. Establishing joint Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for radicalism prevention operations.
4. Active involvement of local communities in early detection and community-based deradicalization.

Overall, synergy between the TNI and Polri is a key prerequisite for effectively and sustainably preventing radicalism. Failure to build synergy can lead to security gaps that are exploited by extremist groups. Thus, the success of TNI-Polri collaboration not only strengthens national defense but also serves as an important foundation for maintaining the integrity and stability of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI).

## RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses a qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach to understand the extent to which the synergy between the TNI and Polri in preventing radicalism has been implemented in the Korem 074/Warastratama region. This research design was chosen because it allows researchers to examine in depth the issues arising in TNI-Polri synergy, with a focus on gaining a thorough understanding of the existing problems. This research was conducted in Korem 074/Warastratama, Kodim 0727/Karanganyar, Kodim 0726/Sukoharjo, Polres Karanganyar, Polres Sukoharjo, Pemkab. Karanganyar, and Sukoharjo Regency Government, located in Sukoharjo and Karanganyar Regencies, where the escalation of radicalism in this area is quite high.

Data was collected through in-depth interviews, observations, and document studies. Informants were selected purposively, including the Commander of the 074/Warastratama Military Command, the Commander of the 0726/Sukoharjo Military District Command, the Commander of the 0727/Karanganyar Military District Command, the Sukoharjo and Karanganyar Police Chiefs, and the Regent of Sukoharjo and the Acting Regent of Karanganyar, along with their respective staff members. Interviews were conducted to gather information from the perspective of informants directly involved in the field in preventing radicalism within the Korem 074/Warastratama region. Additionally, field observations were conducted to directly observe the synergy between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri), as well as documentation involving the collection of secondary data from official documents, policies, and relevant literature related to the implementation of radicalism prevention efforts.

The data was then analyzed using a qualitative descriptive method. The analysis process began with data reduction, where data was sorted and simplified to focus on relevant information. Subsequently, the data was presented in the form of narratives or tables supporting the analysis process, followed by the drawing of conclusions. This method enabled researchers to identify important patterns or themes related to strategies for enhancing TNI-Polri synergy

## RESULT AND DISCUSSION

### Results

Korem 074/Warastratama is tasked with fostering military capabilities, strength deployment, and territorial development to prepare land-based defense areas and maintain regional security in support of Kodam's main mission. The territory of Korem 074/Warastratama lies between 03° 58' 43.97" E – 07° 31' 14.59" S, 03° 58' 12.23" E – 07° 33' 35.68" S, 03° 58' 45.62" E – 07° 33' 08.11" S, and 03° 58' 52.33" E – 07° 33' 30.81" S, covering an area of 93,982.372 km<sup>2</sup>. This area borders Central and East Java provinces, with Korem 073/Makutarama to the north, Korem 081/Dhirotsaha Jaya Madiun to the east, Korem 072/Pamungkas to the west, and the Indian Ocean to the south. Korem 074/Warastratama covers a territory of 29,084.371 km<sup>2</sup>, comprising seven Military District Commands (Kodim): 0723/Klaten, 0724/Boyolali, 0725/Sragen, 0726/Sukoharjo, 0727/Karanganyar, 0728/Wonogiri, and 0735/Surakarta.

The recent arrest of ten suspected terrorists within the Korem 074/Warastratama region has once again highlighted the ongoing threat of radicalism and terrorism in Indonesia, particularly in Central Java. The region, including Surakarta and its surrounding districts, has long been under special attention in the national effort to prevent and combat terrorism. These arrests not only reflect the success of security forces but also illustrate the ongoing challenges in overcoming radicalism.

Radicalism remains one of the most significant threats to Indonesia's stability and security. Since the country's independence, various extremist groups have attempted to disrupt social and political order. Radicalism in Indonesia often stems from distorted interpretations of religion, where religious teachings are misused to justify violence and terrorism. The growth of radical movements in Indonesia has been further fueled by globalization and technological advancements, allowing extremist ideologies to spread rapidly via social media and the internet.

After the 1998 Reform Era, Indonesia experienced an explosion of political freedom, which was also accompanied by the resurgence of radical groups that were previously suppressed by the New Order regime. This freedom created space for extremist ideologies to spread, particularly among communities dissatisfied with socioeconomic conditions. As a result, a series of terrorist acts occurred, including major incidents that shook national and international security, such as the 2002 Bali Bombings and the 2009 attacks on hotels in Jakarta.

Korem 074/Warastratama, particularly the city of Solo (Surakarta), has often drawn attention in discussions about radicalism. Solo has a long-standing history of Islamic propagation, including radical ideologies. Its strategic geographical location and dynamic social-political landscape make it a base for several radical groups that hold significant influence in Indonesia. The city is not only known for its rich culture and heritage but also for being the birthplace and operational ground for several radical figures and groups. It is home to educational institutions, including certain pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), that support radical teachings, reinforcing its reputation as a hotbed for radicalism.

The growing threat of radicalism in the Korem 074/Warastratama region can be attributed to several factors, including complex socio-economic dynamics, the presence of radical groups with deviant ideologies, and educational institutions that serve as platforms for spreading these ideologies. Solo has been a recruitment hub for extremist groups, producing well-known radical figures and becoming the site of several violent incidents, including attacks on security personnel and civilians proving that the threat is real and demands serious action.

One of the main drivers of radicalism in Solo is extremist ideology, often disseminated through international terrorist networks affiliated with local groups. A narrow and deviant religious interpretation is frequently used to legitimize violence. Global networks like ISIS and Al-Qaeda have played a role in promoting radical ideology in Solo, providing financial support, training, and ideological indoctrination.

Beyond ideology, economic and social factors significantly contribute to the rise of radicalism. High economic inequality fosters dissatisfaction, especially among young people who lack access to quality education and employment. Extremist groups exploit this discontent by offering seemingly simple solutions to complex problems, often framed as "jihad" or resistance against perceived enemies responsible for injustice.

Education also plays a key role. The lack of moderate and inclusive religious understanding in both formal schools and religious institutions leaves many individuals vulnerable to radical doctrines. In some cases, closed-off pesantren that teach deviant ideologies serve as breeding grounds for extremism, rejecting Pancasila and the Indonesian state, and promoting violence as a form of religious struggle.

Understanding these underlying factors is crucial to developing targeted and comprehensive counter-radicalism efforts. The challenges facing Solo as one of Indonesia's

radicalism centers require a holistic approach, involving various sectors of society and state institutions to effectively prevent the spread of extremist ideologies.

In responding to the growing threat of radicalism, synergy between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the National Police (Polri) is vital. Both institutions have distinct yet complementary roles in safeguarding national security. Polri, as the main body responsible for law enforcement and internal security, leads counterterrorism efforts through enforcement, intelligence, and prevention operations. Meanwhile, TNI contributes through its role in defending national sovereignty and in Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP), which includes counterterrorism when the threat endangers the state.

The complexity of radicalism, often involving wide-reaching domestic and international networks, underscores the importance of TNI-Polri cooperation. Their collaboration ensures effective intelligence sharing and coordination in counterterrorism operations. This synergy is also essential for forming comprehensive strategies, encompassing prevention, enforcement, and deradicalization programs.

In prevention efforts, both TNI and Polri have made significant contributions. Polri, through its Densus 88 counterterrorism unit, has conducted various successful operations, including in the Korem 074/Warastratama area, thwarting numerous planned attacks. TNI, on the other hand, strengthens regional security through intelligence and deterrence operations as part of its OMSP role.

Additionally, both institutions have been active in raising public awareness about the dangers of radicalism through education and outreach programs. Engaging community leaders, religious figures, and educational institutions strengthens grassroots prevention efforts. TNI and Polri also play roles in deradicalization programs aimed at rehabilitating individuals exposed to extremist ideologies using humane and educational approaches.

Despite these efforts, challenges remain in achieving optimal synergy. Coordination and communication between the two institutions are often hindered by structural and bureaucratic differences. The contrast in approach TNI's military style versus Polri's legal enforcement can sometimes impede effective collaboration. Nevertheless, successful joint operations in Korem 074/Warastratama, including recent raids on terrorist cells, show that with proper coordination and timely information sharing, the TNI-Polri partnership can be highly effective. These successes highlight the importance of synergy not only in enforcement but also in prevention and community outreach.

In conclusion, the synergy between TNI and Polri in the Korem 074/Warastratama area holds great potential in combating and preventing radicalism. However, to enhance its effectiveness, further efforts are needed to strengthen communication, coordination, and collaboration while also engaging local stakeholders in creating a more resilient society against extremist ideologies.

## **Discussion**

Synergy between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri) in Preventing Radicalism in the Korem 074/Warastratama Region

Radicalism is a complex threat that requires a collaborative and comprehensive approach from various state institutions, including the TNI and Polri. Synergy between these two institutions is key to creating national security stability. According to Nijayati and Rahmat (2011), synergy is the combination of elements that produces better results, which in this context refers to joint efforts to prevent the spread of radicalism through effective communication, trust, and collaboration.

### **Forms of Synergy: Communication, Trust, and Collaboration**

#### **Communication**

Effective communication is the foundation of synergy between the TNI and Polri. In practice, communication in the Korem 074/Warastratama area still faces technical and structural

challenges, such as incompatibility between internal communication systems across institutions, delays in information exchange, lack of technological integration, and the absence of joint standard operating procedures (SOPs) for data exchange (Nijayati & Rahmat, 2011). In addition, differences in organizational culture and communication styles among personnel further exacerbate interpersonal relationships. This leads to miscommunication, which in turn slows down strategic decision-making in the field.

### **Trust**

Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman emphasize that trust is built on competence, integrity, and good intentions. In the context of the TNI and Polri, trust has not been fully established due to information secrecy, differences in SOPs, and organizational cultural tensions. The lack of openness in sharing intelligence information, concerns about data leaks, and discomfort in cross-institutional work make cognitive and affective trust difficult to achieve (Mayer et al., 1995). This poses a significant obstacle to building close strategic cooperation.

### **Collaboration**

Ideal collaboration occurs when both institutions share common goals, open communication, and mutual trust (Huxham & Vangen, 2005). However, between the TNI and Polri in Korem 074/Warastratama, it was found that strategic alignment was not yet optimal. The TNI tends to focus on preventive actions and cultural approaches, while the Polri prioritizes legal enforcement aspects. This disparity hinders the effectiveness of joint operations. Additionally, the lack of open communication and limited technological integration remain major obstacles to practical collaboration on the ground.

### **Division of Tasks and Responsibilities**

The TNI and Polri have different legal bases and specializations in dealing with radicalism. Based on Law No. 34 of 2004, the TNI is tasked with military operations other than war, including assisting with security and public order through territorial guidance. These tasks are carried out by Kodim and Koramil through a social approach, strengthening national awareness, and community guidance at the grassroots level (TNI Law, 2004).

The National Police, based on Law No. 2 of 2002, is responsible for law enforcement and maintaining public order and security. In practice, the National Police, through the Solo City Police Department and units such as Densus 88, conducts investigations, cyber surveillance, and arrests of individuals suspected of radicalism (National Police Law, 2002). In terms of intelligence, both have authority under Law No. 17 of 2011. They collaborate in collecting and analyzing data on radicalism threats. On the ground, the TNI provides more tactical support, while the Polri leads in law enforcement operations.

However, this division of roles has not been maximized effectively due to a lack of strategic alignment and overlapping operational roles. The lack of integration between the TNI's territorial development and the Polri's law enforcement causes joint operations to not run smoothly and sometimes leads to conflicts of authority.

### **Synergy Obstacles: Regulations, Sectoral Egos, and Communication**

According to the theory of Interagency Cooperation (Brinkerhoff, 2002), the success of inter-institutional collaboration depends heavily on similarities in structure, organizational culture, and a shared understanding of roles and responsibilities. However, in practice, synergy between the TNI and Polri still faces many challenges. Differences in operational approaches and legal frameworks between the two institutions often create operational confusion.

The TNI operates under the OMSP doctrine, while the Polri is oriented toward a legalistic approach. These differences create inconsistencies in planning and executing operations in the field. Additionally, the absence of clear joint standard operating procedures (SOPs) leads to ambiguity in responsibilities, as explained by Mintzberg (1979) in his theory on the importance of SOPs in complex organizational structures.

Another factor is sectoral ego. Both institutions often defend their respective authorities, leading to dominance and rivalry rather than collaboration (Thomas-Kilmann Conflict Model). This tension is particularly evident when there is overlap in case handling, such as in counter-terrorism operations. Field officers from both institutions often disagree on who has the authority to take control of the situation.

Finally, poor communication systems between institutions are another root cause of the problem. The National Police uses a decentralized system, while the TNI implements centralized command. These structural differences lead to miscommunication and overlapping orders. Dennis K. Mumby, in his theory of organizational communication, asserts that communication failure can occur if organizational structure and culture are not synchronized.

### **Problem Solving through SWOT/TOWS Analysis**

As a problem-solving method, SWOT/TOWS analysis was chosen to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats in the synergy between the TNI and Polri.

- a. Strengths: High public trust in the TNI and Polri, capable operational capabilities, the presence of Babinsa and Bhabinkamtibmas in villages, and the ongoing deradicalization agenda.
- b. Weaknesses: Difficulty in early detection of radicalism, public sympathy toward radical groups, overlapping authority, and the ease of spreading radical ideology via information technology.
- c. Opportunities: Increased public awareness of the dangers of radicalism, support from religious leaders and institutions such as the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) and the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), and collaboration with civil society in strengthening ideological resilience.
- d. Threats: The increasing number of radicalism perpetrators and sympathizers, the infiltration of terrorist ideologies into social media, and the potential exposure of TNI and Polri personnel.

Strategies based on SWOT analysis encourage the establishment of joint SOPs, increased joint training, the creation of an integrated communication system, and the strengthening of interpersonal relationships across institutions. These actions are believed to optimize synergy in facing the evolving dynamics of radicalism in the Korem 074/Warastratama region.

## **CONCLUSION**

In the current era, synergy between the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the Indonesian National Police (Polri) plays a key role in creating security and order within the country. The increasing complexity of issues and problems within the country has prompted the TNI and Polri to strengthen their relationship as agencies that carry out duties and responsibilities in the field of security. Regarding the issue of terrorism, radical ideologies and terrorism, ranging from misguided thinking, deviant ideologies, to terrorist acts carried out in the name of religion, have more freedom to spread and are easily disseminated among the community in the Korem 074/Warastratama region. Synergy between the TNI and Polri in preventing the spread of radicalism is a key factor in maintaining national stability. However, three main indicators—communication, coordination, and trust—are still not functioning effectively. The effectiveness of TNI-Polri synergy in preventing radicalism is highly dependent on the quality of communication between the two institutions. Rapid and accurate information exchange, along with openness in sharing intelligence data, form a crucial foundation. When communication is well-established, preventive actions can be taken swiftly and appropriately. Good coordination between the TNI and Polri is essential to ensure that the tasks and functions of each institution run smoothly without overlapping authority. Through strong coordination, radicalism prevention

programs can be implemented more effectively and efficiently. Joint operation planning and clear division of roles are factors that support the success of this coordination. The level of trust between TNI and Polri personnel is also a key determinant of synergy. This trust is built through positive experiences of cooperation, success in previous operations, and mutual respect. Without strong trust, the synergy formed will be vulnerable to disruptions such as sectoral egos and authority disputes. Overall, despite the challenges in implementing synergy, improving communication quality, better coordination, and building trust between the TNI and Polri will significantly influence the prevention of radicalism. Strengthening these three indicators is a strategic step toward achieving optimal cooperation to create sustainable national stability and security.

The theory of synergy emphasizes the importance of coordinated and integrative cooperation to achieve optimal results. Based on observations, analysis, and discussions, the biggest challenge in realizing this synergy is the difference in approaches and regulatory constraints that limit the roles of each institution. To improve the effectiveness of radicalism prevention, more structured joint efforts are needed in terms of coordination, task distribution, and capacity building. Additionally, strengthening synergy at the operational level and public communication is a key factor in maintaining stability and security in the Korem 074/Warastratama region. Better synergy between the TNI and Polri will be able to make a real contribution to preventing radicalism and maintaining national security. Although the law mandates cooperation between these two institutions, implementation in the field shows that collaboration in preventing the spread of radicalism has not been optimal. One of the main obstacles is differences in policy, sectoral ego, and technical coordination. This has resulted in prevention and handling efforts against radicalism being less effective. Therefore, concrete steps are needed to enhance synergy between the TNI and Polri, including through the establishment of coordination mechanisms, joint activities, and the establishment of standard operating procedures. It is hoped that this will foster stronger cooperation in safeguarding the security and stability of the Korem 074/Warastratama region from the threat of radicalism.

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