Indonesia's Defense Strategy Against Transnational Crimes of the Abu Sayyaf Group in the Sulu Archipelago

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Abstract
Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, is a region where there are many cases of attacks by armed pirate groups. One of the points is in the Sulu Sea which is included in the territorial waters of the Philippines. The waters of the Sulu Sea are directly adjacent to several areas of Indonesia, namely Kalimantan and Sulawesi, so it is not surprising that terrorist groups from the Philippines carry out acts of piracy/jacking of ships originating from Indonesia. The Abu Sayyaf group, which started its criminal activities in the 1990s, hijacked slow-vehicle loaded ships and took hostage crew members who passed through the area. This paper will be prepared using a qualitative descriptive method. This paper will focus more on explaining and providing an overview of the forms of defense strategy carried out by Indonesia in dealing with the problem of transnational crimes by the Abu Sayyaf group. This research data was obtained based on literature review sourced from previous research in the form of journals, books and other scientific works that are relevant to the topic of discussion. The result of this paper is that the Abu Sayyaf Group threat is asymmetrical, coming from non-state actors facing state actors. The Abu Sayyaf group has an interest in establishing an Islamic state in the Philippines and to maintain the existence of its group, the Abu Sayyaf group takes hostage actions by asking for ransom. In order to deal with these non-military threats, the Indonesian national defense strategy is not only carried out by means of the military, but is carried out by relying on 3 (three) main pillars, namely the use of defense force, international cooperation, and the development of defense forces. In facing the threat of the Abu Sayyaf Group, Indonesia has prioritized the pillars of international cooperation even though there have been options for the development and use of defense forces as a deterrent factor to minimize threats.

Keywords: Asymmetrical War Threats, Defense Strategy, Transnational Crime.

INTRODUCTION

Transnational crime, which is also called international crime, can be defined as an organized crime which is committed by groups whose impact is not only on one country but has an impact on several other countries (Peng Wang & Jingyi Wang, 2005, 26). Problems related to transnational crimes are of concern to many countries in the world, especially Indonesia, because they are related to the form of protection of state sovereignty. Due to the increasingly complex problems of transnational crime, the UN finally tried to initiate an agreement called the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized (UNTOC) which focuses on efforts to deal with the problem of transnational crime which has many types. Several types of transnational crime that are the focus of attention are narcotics trafficking, terrorism, human trafficking, illegal fishing, and several other types of transnational crime. Including issues related to piracy and hostage-taking cases committed by armed pirates.

Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, is a region where there are many cases of attacks by armed pirate groups. According to data from The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) in 2022, the Southeast Asian region is the region with the most cases of pirate attacks, exceeding the cases in Africa and Latin America. One of the points is in the Sulu Sea which is included in the territorial waters of the Philippines. The waters of the Sulu Sea are directly adjacent to
several areas of Indonesia, namely Kalimantan and Sulawesi, so it is not surprising that terrorist groups from the Philippines carry out acts of piracy/jacking of ships originating from Indonesia. Abu Sayyaf is a terrorist group which is also an armed pirate originating from the Philippines who carried out acts of hijacking ships and taking ship crews hostages in the Sulu Sea. The Abu Sayyaf group, which started its criminal activities in the 1990s, hijacked slow-vehicle loaded ships and took hostage crew members who passed through the area.

The Abu Sayyaf group in carrying out their actions has an economic motive, namely to get profits in the form of money that they get if there are parties who redeem their victims as hostages. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has not become an obstacle for the Abu Sayyaf group in carrying out its actions. In fact, this was an opportunity for them to be more flexible in taking ship hostages that pass through their area of authority, considering that countries in the world, especially in Southeast Asia, are still focused on dealing with the addition of confirmed cases of Covid-19, which at that time could not be controlled properly. So that the moment was used by the Abu Sayyaf group in carrying out actions in blocking passing ships. We know that during the period 2020 until now it has become a turning point where the country's economy is unstable and tends to decline due to activity restrictions. So, this can be an excuse for the Abu Sayyaf group to carry out its actions.

Cases of hostage-taking by armed pirate groups, especially those carried out by the Abu Sayyaf, can be a threat to national defense because they are included in transnational crime cases which are carried out at the transnational level. The study of asymmetric warfare also answers this case because the Abu Sayyaf group, which is a non-state actor, faces resistance from state actors. The Abu Sayyaf group is not only a threat to Indonesia but to countries in the Southeast Asian region which are the basis of the Abu Sayyaf group. So that several countries in the Southeast Asian region agreed to cooperate in dealing with the actions of the Abu Sayyaf group.

According to the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs through its official website, it stated that the last case handled by the Government in an effort to free victims of being taken hostage by the Abu Sayyaf group occurred in 2021. The victim was a ship crew member (ABK) who was passing through the territory controlled by the Abu Sayyaf group. After going through a long process of trying to free the crew members, the crew members were finally rescued and then flown back to Indonesia to be handed over to their families (RI Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021). Coordination between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the TNI, BIN, and several related agencies in the effort to release it needs to be carried out because it has become a threat to national defense in the Southeast Asian region, especially Indonesia. In addition to efforts to free Indonesian citizens who are victims of being taken hostage by the Abu Sayyaf group, it is still necessary to prepare a defense strategy carried out by Indonesia in facing the threat of transnational crimes by the Abu Sayyaf group in Sulu waters.

This research will be prepared using a qualitative descriptive method. According to Sugiyono (2016: 9) who explains that this qualitative descriptive research aims to describe, explain, and answer in more detail the formulation of the problem to be studied. This research will focus more on explaining and providing an overview of the forms of defense strategy carried out by Indonesia in dealing with the problem of transnational crimes by the Abu Sayyaf group. As well as providing several examples of hostage-taking cases committed by the Abu Sayyaf group from year to year and accompanied by efforts made by the state in dealing with cases of ship hijacking and hostage-taking of crew members which are included in one of the transnational crimes such as diplomatic efforts with the Philippines, deployment of military forces and several other attempts.
RESEARCH METHODS

This research is written using a qualitative method with a descriptive analysis approach. In this research, secondary data obtained through a literature review of books, journals, and other relevant secondary data related to the research problem were used. Furthermore, the data was processed and analyzed so that it could be presented in the form of narrative text.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Abu Sayyaf Terrorist Group

The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) is one of the most radical small terrorist groups in the Southern Philippines region formed in 1991 due to dissatisfaction with the Moro National Liberation Force (MNLF) which took a peaceful path with the Philippine authorities. The Abu Sayyaf group is an attempt at rebellion with the basic principle of establishing an Islamic state. ASG began by attacking non-Muslim Filipinos and kidnapping foreign nationals with demands for extortion or ransom, if their demands were not met, the victim would be beheaded (Pramono, 2019).

In 2016 the ASG detained no less than 22 foreign nationals. The first kidnapping in the media spotlight was the kidnapping on board the Brahma 12-Anand 12 where 10 ship crew members with Indonesian citizenship were colored by one of the ASG sub-groups led by Alhabsyi Misaya. Throughout 2016, ASG carried out 17 kidnappings at sea and 6 failed attempts at sea kidnapping. In addition, 46 foreign nationals and 15 Filipino nationals were defeated and taken hostage by the ASG. The modus operandi used in carrying out this action is to board a fast boat (speedboat) to find the target ship that is sailing in the territorial waters of the Philippines-Malaysia-Indonesia border (Jasmine, 2017).

The nine crew members of the tugboat Christian who were kidnapped in the waters of the Sulu Sea in late 2004, the three crew members of the Bonggaya 91 boat who were ambushed in the area between the east coast of Sabah and the west of the Tawi-Tawi Islands on March 30, 2005, and the kidnapping of a fishing boat captain in the waters around the Basilan Islands on May 21, 2013 (Jasmine, 2017).

In collecting funds ASG commits criminal acts such as kidnapping, taking hostages, smuggling and trafficking in illegal drugs. ASG has affiliations with various other terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, MNLF, Jamaah Islamiyah and Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM). Even in 2014, the video circulated, Isnilon Hapilon, ASG leader declaring allegiance to ISIS.
two years after that, ISIS appointed Hapilon as a mujahid to lead Islamic State army war in the Philippines. (Jasmine, 2017).

**Kidnapping Cases in 2016**

ASG carried out several kidnapping activities around the Sulu islands, on March 25, 2016 ASG carried out a hijacking and kidnapped 10 Indonesian crew members of the Brahma 12 – Anand 12 ship in the Tawi-Tawi sea area for 37 days and demanded a ransom of 50 million Philippine pesos. A week later they hijacked the Massive 6 ship belonging to Malaysia and kidnapped 4 (four) Malaysian citizens. They took all the crew’s electronics devices and demanded a ransom of 130 million Philippine pesos. However, there is controversy that ASG only received 100 million Philippine pesos, and it is suspected that the difference was taken by certain parties. (Jasmine, 2017). On April 15, 2016 ASG kidnapped an Indonesian-flagged ship around the Sitangkai Island area, Philippines and was involved in a shootout with the Malaysian Maritime Police. The four crew members were released after being held captive for 26 days by the ASG. On June 20, 2016, ASG carried out ship hijacking and kidnapping of 7 Indonesian citizens on the tug-barge crew Charles 001 – Robby 152 in the waters bordering the Philippines and Indonesia. On 9 July 2016 3 (three) Indonesian citizens on board a fishing boat LLD 113/5/f became victims of ASG kidnapping in the Lahad Datu area, Sabah, Malaysia but were successfully released by the Indonesian government on 17 September 2016. The increasing number of these kidnapping cases, the Consulate the Republic of Indonesia in Tawau appealed to all Indonesian crew members not to go to sea, especially in areas around the Malaysian and Philippine borders. September 11 ASG kidnapped a Filipino fishing boat crew member in eastern Sabah, Malaysia. Then in around October 2016 the ASG beheaded kidnapped German national Jurgen Kantner because a ransom demand of 30 million Philippine pesos was not paid (ReCAAP, 2017).

**Kidnapping Cases in 2018**

September 11, 2018 ASG kidnapped 2 (two) Indonesian citizens on the Sri Dewi 1 fishing boat sailing in the waters of Gaya Island, Semporna, Sabah, East Malaysia. December 5, 2018 kidnapping of fishing vessel crew, 2 (two) Indonesian citizens and 1 (one) Malaysian citizen in the waters around Laminusa Island, Sulu Archipelago. (ReCAAP R.C., 2018)

**Kidnapping Cases in 2019**

18 June 2019, 10 crew members from 2 (two) Malaysian fishing boats SA/2325/F and SA/5699/C were kidnapped by a group suspected of being ASG in the waters of Lahad Datu Sabah. September 23, 2019, 7 (seven) ASG members attacked fishing vessels SSK00520K and SN 338/4/F and kidnapped 3 (three) Indonesian citizens, around the Tahad Lambisan waters, Datu Island, Sabah, Malaysia. (ReCAAP T.R., 2019)

**Kidnapping Cases in 2020**

January 17, 2020, ASG kidnapped 8 (ABK) fishing boats SSK 00543 around Tambisan Island, Lahad Datu, Sabah, Malaysia. 3 (three) of the crew members of the ship were rescued by the Malaysian side, but 1 (one) person was killed and 4 (four) other crew members were still detained by ASG. (ReCAAP T.R., 2020)

**Table of Kidnapping Cases by ASG in the Sulu Sea**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Kidnapping Date</th>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Hostage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>March 25, 2016</td>
<td>Brahma 12-Anand 12</td>
<td>Indonesia Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>April 01, 2016</td>
<td>Massive 6</td>
<td>Malaysia Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>April 15, 2016</td>
<td>Henry-Christy</td>
<td>Indonesia Citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>June 20, 2016</td>
<td>Charles 001-Robby 152</td>
<td>Indonesia Citizen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Sulu Archipelago is part of the jurisdiction of the Philippines which is close to the borders of Malaysia (Sabah) and Indonesia (East Kalimantan and Sulawesi). The territory of the Sulu Archipelago is divided into 3 (three) main island groups, namely the Basilan, Jolo and Tawi-Tawi Island Groups and several other island groups such as the Sibutu, Tapul, Keeapusan, Laparan and Pangutar Island groups. (DeVantier, Alcala, & Wilkinson, 2004). The majority of the population in the Sulu archipelago adheres to Islamic teachings and applies Islamic sharia law in practice. The people of the Sulu archipelago have livelihoods as fishermen and farmers of lowland plant commodities such as rice, rice fields and coconut. In
general, the economic activities of the people in these islands depend on 2 (two) main things, namely the marine fisheries and agricultural sectors. Service industries such as tourism also have a role in the region. The Sulu Sea has more than 100 landmasses and 200 marine protected areas, many of which have pristine coral reefs such as the Tubbatha Coral Marine Park, Turtle Islands and Bunaken National Park. (DeVantier, Alcala, & Wilkinson, 2004).

The Sulu Islands are included in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) or the Bangsamoro Muslim Mindanao Authority Region. This region is the only region in the Philippines that has self-government. Starting from the Spanish colonial period against the Philippines, it gave rise to the emergence of resistance from Muslim community groups (MNLF) to carry out territorial liberation. The Sulu Archipelago is a base for the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group which has carried out various acts of kidnapping and attacking several foreign nationals for ransom. Criminal acts committed by ASG are included in piracy and international crimes. (Pramono, 2019)

Indonesian Government's Efforts to Respond to the Actions of the Abu Sayyaf Terrorism Group (ASG)

The National Defense Strategy as stated in the Minister of Defense Number Per/22/M/XI1/2007 dated December 28, 2007, prepares early on by the government through efforts to build and foster deterrence capabilities in order to be able to overcome any threat. Thus, Indonesia’s national defense strategy is not only carried out by military means, but is formulated based on 3 (three) main pillars, namely the use of defense force, international cooperation, and the development of defense forces.

Observing the development of the strategic environment in the current era of globalization and in the future changes so rapidly, quickly and dynamically. The challenges and problems in the future are likely to be increasingly complex because the development and progress of telecommunications and transportation technology and information technology have a major influence on changes in the strategic environment, furthermore globalization will change the order of social and economic life as well as patterns and defense systems, thereby also affecting patterns of life in the national dimension, relations between countries, regional and international.

Threats as stated in Republic of Indonesia Law No.17 of 2011 are every attempt, work, activity and action, both domestic and foreign, which is assessed and/or proven to endanger the safety of the nation, security, sovereignty, territorial integrity of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Republic of Indonesia, and national interests in various aspects, whether ideological, political, economic, socio-cultural, as well as defense and security.

Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 5 of 2009 concerning Ratification of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations Convention Against Organized Transnational Crime) in general states that organized transnational crime is a form of crime that threatens social life, economy, politics, security and world peace. Effective interstate cooperation and the establishment of a legal framework are of paramount importance in tackling transnational organized crime. Thus, Indonesia can more easily obtain international access and cooperation in the prevention and eradication of organized transnational crime. Indonesia already has a number of laws whose substance is related to this Convention, one of which is: Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulation in Lieu of Law number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism to become Law.

In order to enhance international cooperation in efforts to prevent and eradicate transnational organized crime, the United Nations co-signed the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime on 15 December 2000 in Parlermo, Italia, as a
manifestation of commitment to eradicate organized transnational crime through the framework of bilateral, regional or international cooperation.

The Convention states that a crime is categorized as an organized transnational crime if the crime is committed:

a. in more than one region of the country;
b. in one country, but the preparation, planning, direction or control of said crime is carried out in the territory of another country;
c. in a country's territory, but involves an organized group of criminals who commit crimes in more than one country's territory; or
d. in a country's territory, but the consequences of not being criminal are felt in other countries.

The military base as the beginning of the battle to control the elements of offensive and defensive combat.

**Indonesia's Defense Strategy Against the Threat of the Abu Sayyaf Group**

Looking at the history and activities carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group, especially in terms of transnational crime activities in the Sulu Archipelago, the Abu Sayyaf group is categorized as a terrorist who poses a threat to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Indonesia is a country with the largest number of cases in which its citizens have become victims of being taken hostage by the Abu Sayyaf group. This threat is asymmetrical, coming from non-state actors facing state actors. The Abu Sayyaf group has an interest in establishing an Islamic state in the Philippines and to maintain the existence of its group, the Abu Sayyaf group takes hostage actions by asking for ransom. In order to deal with these non-military threats, the Indonesian national defense strategy is not only carried out by means of the military, but is carried out by relying on 3 (three) main pillars, namely the use of defense force, international cooperation, and the development of defense forces. In facing the threat of the Abu Sayyaf Group, Indonesia has prioritized the pillars of international cooperation even though there have been options for the development and use of defense forces and also the development of defense forces as a deterrent factor to minimize threats.

**Kerjasama Internasional**

The Indonesian government, in this case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has carried out several strategies:

1. **Total Diplomacy** with the Philippine government and the Abu Sayyaf Terrorism group. Total diplomacy builds trust between formal (government) and informal (ASG) parties with 2 (two) main techniques, namely (1) analyzing the type of Abu Sayyaf group and (2) having a negotiator or network. Indonesia involves other parties in the ASG hostage release efforts such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), religious organizations, civil society, and other humanitarian agencies. The government cooperates with Indonesian religious leaders and the Sulu Islands, local communities and other figures in the Sulu Islands and the government of the Philippines. (Istikharoh, 2017; Misya, 2017; Wulandari, Pramono, & Warno, 2017).
2. TNI Clandestine Intelligence and Military Operations in collaboration with the Government of the Philippines under the coordination of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Istikharoh, 2017; Misya, 2017; Wulandari, Pramono, & Warno, 2017);

3. Payment of ransom, although the Indonesian government refuses to pay ransom as an attempt to free hostages, this is an option for release. Although it is not certain that if the ransom payment is made there is a guarantee that the hostages will be released (Misya, 2017)

4. Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines are acting to prevent similar things from happening through Joint Declaration antara Foreign Ministers and Chiefs of Defence Forces of Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines on Immediate measure to Address Security Issues in the Maritime Area od Common Concern among Indonesia, Malaysia and Philippines. (Wulandari, Pramono, & Warno, 2017)

5. Multitrack diplomacy, among others, by intensifying communication and coordination with the Philippine government, emphasizing the safety of hostages, conducting negotiations with Moro figures, and carrying out intelligence operations. The second track is by collaborating with other parties such as the Sukma Foundation to negotiate together with informal Sulu figures, as well as with the International Red Cross and with the community to be able to monitor the health conditions and movements of the hostages. (Dewi, 2019).

**Bentuk- bentuk Kerjasama Internasional**

The choice of international cooperation has been made since hostage-taking cases have become increasingly widespread and have become a threat to national security.

1. **Indomalphi Cooperation** (Trilateral Policy of Indonesia, Philippines and Malaysia).

   The massive crimes committed by the Abu Sayyaf Group in 2016 in Sulu Waters led to the initiation of the governments of Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia to enter into trilateral cooperation. The Trilateral Agreement discusses security issues called the Indomalphi Joint Working Group on Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement (JWG on TCA). The contents of the agreement in Indomalphi security cooperation are:
   a. Carry out joint patrols on the borders of the three countries
   b. Do Quick Respond
   c. Created National Vocal Point
   d. Creating Hotline Communication

   In 2021, after the release of four Indonesian fishermen who were held hostage by the Abu Sayyaf for one year, Indomalphi’s collaboration was strengthened again and continued to

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Figure 3. Schematic of the actors involved in the ASG hostage release
be followed up through online meetings of the three countries. At the online meeting discussed the following matters:

a. Implementation and operationalization of the cooperation framework between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia in the form of steps to address security issues in the maritime area which are a common concern.

b. Discusses Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and Operating Guidelines.

c. Continuing cooperation under the TCA framework in the Maritime Areas of Common Concern despite the many obstacles due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

d. The importance of empowering women and the younger generation in efforts to prevent and combat terrorism, as well as tackling the root causes of terrorism.

e. Emphasis on the importance of tackling terrorism in a multidimensional, comprehensive and balanced way between hard and soft approaches.

2. Regional Cooperation of AOIP (ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pasific)

AOIP is a form of cooperation in the Asean-Indo Pacific region in increasing mutual trust through a culture of dialogue to form strategic trust. ASEAN has agreed on the document ASEAN on Indo-Pacific (AOIP) in June 2019 committed to creating security stability, including security in the Sulu Sea and North Sulawesi Sea (Polhukam RI, 2020). AOIP cooperation for regional stability includes 4 (four) main aspects, namely:

a. Maritime Security

b. Sustainable Development Goals (SDG)

c. Connectivity

d. Economic Cooperation and another sahep of cooperation

3. ReCAAP (the Regional Coopreation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia).

ReCAAP is a littoral stage collaboration which came into effect on September 4, 2006 which has been ratified by 20 member countries. Among them are Australia, China, Denmark, India, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Sri Lanka, United Kingdom, United States, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam. Through this organization, Indonesia can gain access to information, exchange information and a wider network capacity so that it is expected to be able to improve incident response to the threat of hostage-taking by the Abu Sayyaf Group. However, on the other hand, an organization like this can pose a potential violation of sovereignty because several rules in this organization give permission to its member countries to use any territorial waters in the interests of ReCAAP (Rustam, 2017).

4. ASEAN Regional Forum

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is a multilateral dialogue forum established in 1994 and consists of 27-member countries, including 10 ASEAN member countries, as well as countries such as Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States. ARF aims to promote dialogue, cooperation and security in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as enhance trust and understanding between members. One of ARF’s main roles is in tackling transnational crime in ASEAN, including human trafficking, cyber crime, drug distribution, and terrorism. ARF seeks to strengthen cooperation between member states to address these issues through information sharing, training and capacity building, as well as increased coordination between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. ARF has created a number of cooperative mechanisms in tackling transnational crime, including the ARF Emergency Bomb Action, which was created in 2004 to respond to terrorist attacks, and the ARF Emergency Bombing Information Center, which aims to strengthen intelligence cooperation between members in addressing terrorism security threats. In addition, ARF also promotes dialogue and cooperation in addressing the sources of transnational crime, such as poverty, inequality and regional
tensions, with the aim of promoting security, stability and peace in the Asia-Pacific region. In order to deal with transnational crime, ARF also seeks to cooperate with international organizations such as the United Nations, Interpol, and other regional security organizations to strengthen law enforcement and intelligence capacities in the region. Thus, ARF plays an important role in promoting security and stability in ASEAN and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2019).

Use of Defense Force

Presidential Decree 8 of 2021 concerning the General Policy for National Defense is the deployment and use of defense forces based on the Sishankamrata doctrine and strategy which is carried out based on consideration of the threats facing Indonesia. Non-traditional threats made by non-state actors against territorial integrity, state sovereignty, and the safety of the Indonesian people are included in this threat in the form of hostage taking by the Abu Sayyaf Group using Defense Forces.

TNI as the main component of national defense militarily has an expanded role in countering terrorism in Indonesia. First, through various countermeasures operations. The expansion of the TNI's role is included in Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) based on Law No. 34 of 2002 article 7, that the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) as a means of national defense has the duty to deal with acts of terrorism in the title Military Operations Other than War (OMSP).

Second, according to the agenda of the Indomalphi agreement, the TNI (Indonesian National Army) has an important role in the Indomalphi agreement, especially in maintaining stability and peace in the Southeast Asian region. As a member country of the Indomalphi Agreement, Indonesia is committed to taking part in regional cooperation and consultation efforts with other countries in dealing with threats and challenges that occur in the region. TNI has a special role in combating the threat of communism and terrorism which is the main focus of the agreement. As part of the agreement, the TNI cooperates with the militaries of other countries to improve capabilities and coordination in combating this threat. In addition, the TNI also plays a role in monitoring and securing Indonesia's borders with neighboring countries to prevent acts of terrorism and the movement of people who could endanger national security. In subsequent developments, the TNI continues to play an important role in maintaining stability and peace in Southeast Asia, both regionally and internationally. The TNI is involved in UN peace missions in several countries and continues to cooperate with militaries from other countries in maintaining regional stability.

Since 2015, the Indonesian government has clearly used the TNI as a deterrence force against terrorist groups. The involvement of the TNI in countering terrorism is through deploying TNI troops and securing the Indonesia-Philippines border which is the entry and exit point for Islamic militants. The deterrent effect in an area is carried out so that a terrorist group does not change its choice of theater to another area. Deterrence is also sought through a policy of retaliating against terrorist attacks, a scenario that must be considered in light of the increasing frequency of Indonesian citizens becoming victims of ship hijacking and hostage-taking by the Abu Sayyaf Group.

According to Presidential Decree No. 8 of 2021 concerning the General Policy for National Defense, the development of the Defense force includes the development of national capabilities in the field of defense at the policy and operational levels. At the policy level in the form of increasing the capacity of the government bureaucracy (Ministry of Agriculture and other related Ministries/Agencies) in formulating political decisions related to the management of National Defense. Coast Guard).
Bakamla RI (Indonesia Coast Guard)

Bakamla RI (Indonesia Coast Guard) in its efforts to increase security in the Sulu Sea area as stated in the Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement between Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia has mapped the types of threats that occur in the Sulu Waters. One of them is the case of hostage taking by the Abu Sayyaf Group. Other non-military threats that are of concern to Bakamla RI are threats to marine and fishery resources, customs, immigration and narcotics. (Bakamla RI, 2021). Bakamla RI establishes a Strategy for Increasing Sulu Sea Security Collaboration with an emphasis on four things that are the main focus, namely:

a. Maintaining the framework of cooperation at home and abroad
b. Strengthen the rule of law in handling and overcoming threats in the Sulu Sea
c. Increasing elements of patrols on an ongoing basis
d. Increase the improbability of Communication systems and Information systems
e. Emphasizing the need to increase maritime security through strengthening coast guards in the region which is manifested by the formation of coast guards.

It is hoped that the things that are the main focus above will be able to minimize and even eliminate transnational crime activities in the form of taking hostages against Indonesian citizens who are active around the waters of the Sulu Sea.

The Case of Kidnapping by the ASG in Asymmetric Warfare Views

Steven Metz and Douglas Johnston in Schmitt (2010) define asymmetric warfare in national security as acting, organizing and thinking differently from your opponent to maximize your own advantage, exploit your opponent’s weaknesses, initiate or gain freedom in moving/acting. It can be political strategy, military strategy or a combination of both. In the form of methods that differ from opponents, technology, organizational values, time perspective or a combination thereof. It can happen in a short time or a long time. It can be a deliberate technique or by default. Can be implemented in secret or in combination with a symmetrical approach. It can attack the psychological or physical dimension.

Buffaloe also explained that asymmetric warfare is a new type of war in which intensity is one of the main factors, unlike symmetrical warfare, asymmetrical war is more on guerrilla warfare, subversion, insurgency, ambushes rather than fighting, infiltration, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy rather than involving in symmetrical combat. Asymmetric warfare targets economic unrest and ethnic conflict (Buffaloe, 2006). ASG and its actions are an example of an element in asymmetric warfare, namely conflict between unequal forces, located in the population (separatist Islamic groups), and targeting ethnic riots, and involving the political sector.

CONCLUSION

Looking at the history and activities carried out by the Abu Sayyaf Group, especially in terms of transnational crime activities in the Sulu Archipelago, the Abu Sayyaf group is categorized as a terrorist who poses a threat to the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. Indonesia is a country with the largest number of cases in which its citizens have become victims of being taken hostage by the Abu Sayyaf group. This threat is asymmetrical, coming from non-state actors facing state actors. The Abu Sayyaf group has an interest in establishing an Islamic state in the Philippines and to maintain the existence of its group, the Abu Sayyaf group takes hostage actions by asking for ransom.

In order to deal with these non-military threats, the Indonesian national defense strategy is not only carried out by means of the military, but is carried out by relying on 3 (three) main pillars, namely the use of defense force, international cooperation, and the development of
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