

Improvement Efforts Of Indonesia's Defense Diplomacy Performance Via Deterrence Strategy In Dealing North Natuna Sea Conflict (2016-2021)

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Abstract

One of Indonesia's most actual maritime border disputes is the border dispute between Indonesia and China in the North Natuna Sea. This research focuses on examining how to improve the performance of Indonesia's defense diplomacy through deterrence strategies in dealing with conflicts in the North Natuna Sea. This research uses qualitative-descriptive. The location of this research was carried out in Jakarta, in this case the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Indonesia. Research time for six months. The research subjects were six sources. The object of this research is about improving the performance of defense diplomacy through deterrence strategies in the North Natuna Sea. The primary data collection technique is an in-depth interview method, while the secondary data collection technique uses a literature study. The results show that the performance of Indonesia's defense diplomacy in the North Natuna Sea for the 2016-2021 period is still relatively weak, especially if it is related to the potential threat from the Chinese side. Indonesia's deterrence strategy in the North Natuna Sea for the 2016-2021 period has so far been carried out with external policies, namely cooperating with foreign parties, both bilaterally, regionally, and globally. Indonesia's efforts to improve defense diplomacy in the North Natuna Sea through a deterrence strategy can be carried out with at least 10 items of deterrence strategy, including conducting joint military exercises; enhance joint surveillance and patrols; increase the discussion of maritime issues in regional and international forums; and increase advocacy for the law of the sea.

Keywords: *Defense diplomacy, Deterrence strategy, North Natuna Sea, China, joint patrol, military exercises.*

INTRODUCTION

The South China Sea issue is not only an international and regional problem, but also a national problem for Indonesia. The South China Sea issue is a national problem for Indonesia, especially when the conflict in the South China Sea (potentially) spreads and involves 12 nautical miles around Natuna Island. Since 2017 the territory within the scope of the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) has been named the North Natuna Sea by Indonesia, in this case the Maritime Ministry. The naming of the EEZ area of Natuna Island into the North Natuna Sea is Indonesia's affirmation that if the South China Sea conflict spreads to the North Natuna Sea, then it means that it concerns Indonesia's national interest. The North Natuna Sea is only a small part of the South China Sea which China and several other countries claim.

The following are issues related to the South China Sea or (potentially) spreading to the North Natuna Sea as part of Indonesia's national interests.

1. Indonesia claims that Natuna Island and the 12 nautical miles around it belongs to Indonesia. Indonesia adheres to the fact that Indonesia has exclusive control over economic activities within 200 nautical miles known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Indonesia's claim contradicts China's claim that the EEZ does not apply, because it had only appeared in the world order after the Second World War, while their "nine dash line" had appeared long

before UNCLOS 1982. The Nine Dash Line originally appeared in China's map as the 11 Dash Line in 1947. However, in the 1950s two lines were removed, so that it became the 9 Dash Line to cut through the Gulf of Tonkin as a signal for communist comrades in North Vietnam (Salihah, 2020). This means that even though Indonesia is not a claimant state in the South China Sea, the nine-dash line claimed by China intersects with Indonesia's national interests in the North Natuna Sea.

2. The Indonesia-China conflict has been going on for a long time. Indonesia has been "dragged" in the South China Sea dispute since 2010, namely since China claimed Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the northern region of the Natuna Islands. China's unilateral claims continued and peaked in 2016. In March, May and June 2016, there were conflicts between the governments of Indonesia and China, due to illegal Chinese ships entering Natuna waters and carrying out illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing). Violations of Indonesian sovereignty were also violated by Chinese ships on December 19, 2019. The most recent incident was that in 2020 there were violations by Chinese fishermen or Chinese coast guard vessels (Coast Guard China, CGC) which entered the waters of the Natuna Sea (Iswara, 2021).




Figure 1: Chinese Version of the Nine Dash Line (Jennings, 2021)

3. Indonesia, July 2017, through the Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs launched a new map of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). The map focuses on Indonesia's sea borders with other countries. In the map, there is an update of the sea column north of Natuna. Previously the sea column was referred to as the South China Sea. In the new map, the column is called the North Natuna Sea, following the name of the continental shelf in the area (Iswara). This means that the name of the South China Sea "Indonesian part" was also renamed the North Natuna Sea. The Chinese government considers that Indonesia violated the international agreement contained in the S-23 IHO regarding the naming of the South China Sea area which stretches 12,000 kilometers from China's baseline (Sambogo, 2018).

Indonesia's action to change the name of the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea is a policy to affirm RI's sovereignty and a political marker to China that the area still belongs

to Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), in accordance with the Law stipulated in Law Number 5 of 1983 concerning Exclusive Economic Zone (Yusro et al., 2020). Article 2 of Law No. 5/1983 states that “The Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone is a lane outside the lanes and borders with the Indonesian territorial sea as stipulated under the law in force concerning Indonesian waters which includes the seabed, the land beneath it and the water above it with the outer limit of 200 (two hundred) nautical miles measured from the base line of the territorial sea of Indonesia.

The North Natuna Sea is located to the north of the Natuna Islands, bordering the southern EEZ of Vietnam and the southern part of South China. The North Natuna Sea is located south of Natuna Island in Indonesian waters. This means that Indonesia has given names to the two waters that are part of the South China Sea, namely the North Natuna Sea between the Natuna Islands and the Lingga Islands and the Tambelan Islands in the North Natuna Sea between the Natuna Islands from Cape Ca Mau at the southern tip of the Mekong Delta in Vietnam. (Parameswaran, 2017; Allard & Muthe, 2017). RI's move certainly did not get a positive response from China (Iswara, 2021).

The sea boundary dispute between the North Natuna Sea boundary which is claimed by Indonesia, and the nine-dash line set by China can be seen from the following map Figure 2. In Figure 3 it can be seen that there is an intersection of claims between the boundaries of the North China Sea (blue dotted line) and the nine-dash line which is claimed by China.




Figure 2: Map of Indonesia's EEZ Slice and Continental Shelf with Vietnam, Malaysia and China Claims (Nine-Dash Line) in the South China Sea
Ditwilhan Ditjen Strahan Kemhan (2022)



Sumber: <https://21stcenturyasianarmsrace>

Figure 3: Slice Map of the North Natuna Sea Boundary (Blue Line) with the Nine Dash Line of Chinese Claims (Red Line) Santoso (2020)

The Chinese government views that Indonesia's action to change the name of the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea is an action that is not in accordance with international maritime law rules, because the area intersects with the territory claimed by the Chinese government as the South China Sea with a sea boundary of nine dotted lines. -break (nine-dash line). The Chinese government considers Indonesia to make claims that are not in line with international customs and international regional standards regarding the designation of the South China Sea area (Luu, Hunt & Feingold, 2017; Santoso, 2020). Therefore, the Chinese Government urged Indonesia to cancel the renaming of the South China Sea to the North Natuna Sea (Ratnasari, 2017).

4. Conflicts in the South China Sea are also a threat to regional stability in Southeast Asia, because there are 10 countries in the region that have maritime boundaries with the South China Sea, namely China and eight ASEAN member countries, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, the Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Cambodia, Thailand, and one country outside ASEAN, namely Taiwan (Yusro et al., 2020).

Considering that China's claim with the nine-dash line intersects with Indonesian territory in the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia has a national interest related to conflicts in the South China Sea, especially those concerning the North Natuna Sea area. Indonesia's national interests, when referring to the category of national interests (national interests) according to Nuechterlein (2012), are (i) defense interests related to territorial sovereignty, (ii) economic interests, related to the utilization of natural resources in the EEZ territory; and (iii) the interests of the world order, to help maintain security stability in the region as an international trade and shipping route (Sulistiyani et al, 2021).

In relation to Indonesia's national interests in the North Natuna Sea, Indonesia has sent protest notes to China in 2016, 2019 and 2020 due to IUU fishing. The protest note was conveyed by the Indonesian government through the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta. On 26 May 2020 Indonesia sent a note verbale to UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres confirming Indonesia's stance and position on the dispute in the South China Sea. Apart from sending a protest note, Indonesia has also shown its presence in the North Natuna Sea. On June 23, 2016 President Joko Widodo held a limited cabinet meeting aboard KRI Imam Bonjol-383.

Given the continued tension in the South China Sea, including between Indonesia and China regarding the waters of Natuna Island, Indonesia needs to improve its defense diplomacy performance through a strategy of deterrence (deterrence diplomacy). In summary, the notion

of deterrence diplomacy is diplomacy that makes the opposing state think many times about making claims or military attacks (Filippidou, 2020). Boyce (2019) defines a deterrence strategy in four dimensions, namely the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) dimensions. Among the four elements, the scope of deterrence in this study is limited to the scope of defense diplomacy, so that the economic aspect (E) is not discussed in the scope of deterrence in this study.

If summarized, Indonesia's conflict with China in the North Natuna Sea is as follows: (1) There is a border conflict between RI and China in the North Natuna Sea, because China's nine-dash line intersects with the 200-mile EEZ boundary of Indonesia in North Natuna Sea. (2) China committed territorial violations in the North Natuna Sea by repeatedly having Chinese coast guard ships enter the North Natuna Sea area. Likewise, illegal fishing from China has repeatedly entered the North Natuna Sea. Related to this, the Republic of Indonesia several times sent protest notes to China through the Chinese Embassy in Jakarta. (3) Indonesia named the area 200 miles from the coast as the North Natuna Sea. In this regard, China protested against RI re-naming the territorial waters of the sea as the South China Sea. Until now, the Republic of Indonesia still names the waters as the North Natuna Sea.

There are a number of reasons why defense diplomacy using a strategy of deterrence is important for Indonesia in relation to Indonesia's position facing China in terms of claims to Natuna Island:

1. Indonesia will suffer a huge loss if it has to fight militarily with China in the South China Sea.
2. Indonesia's military strength, especially its maritime power, is still far behind when compared to China's maritime power.
3. Indonesia and China also have a lot of cooperation in the fields of economy, trade and investment, so war is not the best solution, because it will sacrifice a lot of Indonesia's national interests as well.
4. Indonesia has the potential to play many cards in the South China Sea. Indonesia is a leader for ASEAN which consists of 10 countries. Bilaterally, Indonesia has good relations with the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, which incidentally is China's opponent in the South China Sea.
5. Indonesia itself in the ASEAN context is currently carrying out many negotiation agendas with China

To what extent is the performance of defense diplomacy through Indonesia's deterrence diplomacy strategy in the South China Sea, the following is an evaluation of the deterrence strategy in the context of defense diplomacy based on the scope of defense diplomacy activities from Cottey and Forster (2004) as *das sollen*, and evaluation achievements by Indonesia today (*das sein*). According to Cottey and Forster (2004), there are 12 indicators of defense diplomacy that intersect with deterrence strategies. Among the 12 indicators, it has been shown that there is relatively no gap between the *das sollen* and *das sein* in their respective achievements, while some indicators still show a wide gap in achievement.

At the end of 2016, the TNI conducted the peak exercise "Angkasa Yudha 2016" in North Natuna and was attended by President Joko Widodo. Then July 20-26 2020, the TNI-AL held routine exercises in the Java Sea to the Natuna Sea. This military exercise was attended by 26 KRI, 17 aircraft, and 18 combat vehicles. October 2020 The Indonesian Navy also conducted a joint exercise with the Japanese Navy in the form of a passing exercise (*passex*) in the Southwest Indonesian ZEE of Jemaja Island until it left North Natuna waters (TNI Information Center, 2020). 4. The indicator of the deterrence strategy in the context of defense

diplomacy that still needs to be improved by the Republic of Indonesia is the control of the North Natuna Sea region. Domination of the sea area, among other things, by mobilizing the increasing number of fishermen looking for fish in North Natuna. After the incident of the Chinese fishing boat, Han Tan Cou, illegally fishing in Natuna waters, which is several nautical miles from the Natuna coastline and 900 nautical miles from China, in 2020, the Indonesian government deployed 900 fishermen from Java Island, aboard 30 vessels with a capacity of 100 GT up, towards Natuna. The government has prepared a budget of IDR 60 billion to build the Natuna integrated area, including flats for fishermen, cold storage with a capacity of 3,000 tons and a fish auction place (Kusumadewi, 2016). Meanwhile, the Indonesian fisheries public company (Perum Perindo) will become the offtaker of their fish catch (Hidayat, 2020). 5. An indicator of the deterrence strategy in the context of defense diplomacy that still needs to be improved by the Republic of Indonesia is the arms industry, including among others joint industry with fellow ASEAN members and with China. Four ASEAN countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand), in 2011, have formed the ASEAN Defense Industry Collaboration (ADIC). The aim of forming ADIC is to reduce the need for defense equipment for ASEAN members from USD 25 billion to USD 12.5 billion. ADIC, however, faces various obstacles that must be overcome immediately. The results of Ningsih's research (2019) conclude that there are significant differences between ADIC members in technological, doctrinal, and military organizational aspects; where these differences pose obstacles in determining the arms industry platform.

Based on this background, the expected defense diplomacy through a deterrence strategy is to create conditions in which other countries that have the potential to attack, seize or control the North Natuna Sea (namely part of the South China Sea claimed by Indonesia) discourage this intention, so that Indonesia remains sovereign over the region

RESEARCH METHODS

This study chose the method of case studies (case studies). The author chose the case study method because it allows the author to explore in depth and detail the events, processes and activities studied (Creswell & Creswell, 2018: 51; Sugiyono, 2013: 14-15). In addition, case studies, as stated by Yin (2014: 1), are suitable for writers who want to get answers to the questions "how" and "why", and when writers want to examine a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life context. (real-life context).

Judging from the nature of the research, this research is descriptive in nature. Descriptive study, as defined by Cooper & Schindler (2014: 656) is research that describes a subject, person, or event through data collection, the study reveals who, what, when, where, or how much, which concerns a variable univariately. According to Sekaran & Bougie (2016: 43) the purpose of a descriptive study is to obtain data that describes the topic of interest. Descriptive studies are usually designed to collect data that describe characteristics of objects (such as people, organizations, products, or brands), events, or situations. Descriptive studies can use a quantitative or qualitative approach, while this research is a descriptive study.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Indonesian Defense Diplomacy Performance In The North Natuna Sea

Based on the research results, it can be seen that the republic of indonesia's defense diplomacy in the north natuna sea is still relatively weak. that the republic of indonesia's

defense diplomacy in the north natuna sea is still weak, it can be seen from the natuna sea that foreign ships are still being visited by foreign ships that do not intend to just pass through the sea. foreign ships entering the north natuna sea appear to have the intention of being a measure of defense diplomacy, for example coast guard ships from china. against these foreign ships, ri was only able to issue a protest note through diplomatic channels, but was unable to make adequate deterrence so that these foreign ships did not dare to enter the waters of the north natuna sea.

weaknesses in indonesia's defense diplomacy in the north natuna sea are also evident from the very minimal presence of government (non-military) ships in the north natuna sea. the number of patrol boats for the maritime security agency (bakamla) and the directorate general of maritime and fishery resources supervision (psdkp) is very limited, and their tonnage size is relatively low, so it is not easy to reach 200 nautical miles from the coast of natuna island. even though bakamla's function is as the coordinator of k/a security at sea in accordance with pp 13 of 2022.

in the north natuna sea in particular, and the south china sea in general, the presence of chinese patrols tends to be more dominant. there are many of them, up to hundreds of ships can arrive, with a relatively large tonnage size so that the length can be between 35-50 meters or even longer. they also have trained fishermen who are used to wading through the wide ocean. this is very far from the patrol capacity of the maritime security agency (bakamla) and the directorate general of maritime and fishery resources supervision (psdkp) with relatively small vessels, with a relatively limited number of personnel, and with a limited number of fleets.

when compared to the military strengths of china and indonesia, this can be seen from the data on naval armament ownership based on global power (2021) as recapitulated in table 1.

Table 1: comparison of indonesian and chinese naval armament strength (in world rank 2021)

naval armament	indonesia	china
<i>fleet strength</i>	296 (6 th)	777 (1 st)
<i>aircraft carriers</i>	0 (140 th)	2 (2 nd)
<i>submarines</i>	4 (17 th)	79 (1 st)
<i>destroyer</i>	0 (140 th)	41 (2 nd)
<i>frigates</i>	7 (10 th)	49 (1 st)
<i>patrol vessels</i>	181 (3 rd)	152 (5 th)
<i>mine warfare</i>	11 (11 th)	36 (2 nd)
<i>helo carriers</i>	0 (140 th)	1 (5 th)

after the end of the cold war (cold-war) between the forces of capitalist countries led by the united states of america with socialist/communist countries led by the soviet union; then china continues to grow into a country with increasingly strong economic power with a gdp reaching usd 1.2661 billion (compared to canada's gdp of usd 714 billion), continuing to boost its military strength, including in the south china sea region.

along with increasing china's economic power, china's military power continues to increase, as seen from the increase in their military budget. in 2017 china has increased its military budget to usd 215 billion. this indicates that china's military budget has increased by 28.9 percent since 2014 (sipri, 2017). in addition to increasing military strength, china also tends to be expansionist. in 2016 china occupied most of the islands in the south china sea, reclaiming around 3,200 hectares to build military bases, hangars, barracks and communication facilities in the spratly and parcel islands (sudirman et al., 2020).

Deterrence Strategy In The North Natuna Sea

Indonesia's deterrence strategy in the north Natuna sea so far can be carried out with external policies. The external policy referred to so far is in the form of cooperation with other countries, both bilaterally and multilaterally. Bilaterally, in the context of the north Natuna conflict, Indonesia is directly dealing with China to negotiate the issue of overlapping sea boundaries with China. RI-China bilateral strategy so far has not been implemented by RI. RI has indeed had a lot of diplomacy with China so far, but it seems that the two countries have avoided discussing the intersection of the two countries' maritime boundaries in the north Natuna sea. The Indonesian government always says that Indonesia has no problems with China. It is only natural that the impression arises that the Indonesian government seems reluctant to enter into conflict with China.

RI's cooperation with other countries needed in a deterrence strategy is not only in the military field, but also cooperation in non-military fields such as cooperation in trade, investment, technology, and others. Indonesia's cooperation with other countries is carried out in many forums, ranging from bilateral forums, regional forums such as ASEAN, to international forums such as APEC, G-20 and the United Nations.

The strategy for Indonesia's presence in the north Natuna sea has so far been carried out through the presence of sea patrols. The sea patrol will show Indonesia's presence and is an indirect form of defense diplomacy. The strategic direction to dominate and control the north Natuna sea has been around for a long time, but the problem lies in Indonesia's lack of capacity to implement it. The Republic of Indonesia's presence in the north Natuna sea is currently being carried out by presenting more adequate numbers of traditional fishermen. However, it must be admitted that the fishing equipment owned by our fishermen is relatively limited, so that Indonesian fishermen do not have the ability to brave the tidal waves of sea water up to 200 miles from the shoreline.

Another strategy for Indonesia's deterrence in the north Natuna sea so far has been through the law of the sea and international law. This was mainly carried out by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia.

In view of the types of deterrence strategies carried out by Indonesia, it seems that they are more inclined to the political and legal aspects, so that they are more characterized by pure diplomacy (not defense diplomacy), rather than being characterized by a deterrence strategy on a military aspect. The relatively weak deterrence strategy from a military perspective to support defense diplomacy can be seen from the following four indicators:

1. ship and aircraft visits are relatively limited. Indonesia, for example, was only able to deploy several warships, between three and four warships (KRI) for one operation in the north Natuna sea. Meanwhile, China can deploy 30 to 150 ships at once.
2. ownership of defense equipment. There is an imbalance in the ownership of defense equipment between Indonesia and China. Based on the ranking from Global Power (2021), China's armed forces are ranked third in the world, while Indonesia is ranked 16th in the world. Specifically regarding the weapons strength of the navy, there is a disparity in statements between the Chinese and Indonesian navies, with the position of China's armed forces being far above Indonesia's armed forces. Therefore, Indonesia is relatively weak when it comes to show of force in the north Natuna sea.
3. military exercises in the north Natuna sea are still rarely carried out. Indonesia conducted war games in the north Natuna sea in 2016 and 2020. At the end of 2016, the TNI conducted the peak exercise "Angkasa Yudha 2016" in north Natuna and was attended by President Joko Widodo. Then July 20-26 2020, the TNI-AL held routine exercises in the Java sea to the

natuna sea. this military exercise was attended by 26 kri, 17 aircraft, and 18 combat vehicles. october 2020 the indonesian navy also conducted a joint exercise with the japanese navy in the form of a passing exercise (passex) in the southwest indonesian zee of jemaja island until it left north natuna waters (tni information center, 2020).

4. mastery of the north natuna sea region. control of the north natuna sea area so far has been carried out, among other things, by mobilizing an increasing number of fishermen to fish in north natuna. it's just that the tonnage of these fishing boats is still very inadequate to reach the vast seas of the eez, so that the strategy for deploying fishermen is far from reflecting that indonesia controls the waters of the north natuna sea.

Improving Indonesian Defense Diplomacy In The North Natuna Sea Through A Deterrence Strategy

Improving RI's defense diplomacy in the north natuna sea through a strategy of deterrence can be done through the 10 points of the strategy of deterrence as previously mentioned. the sources agreed that several steps of deterrence by the republic of indonesia in the context of defense diplomacy had in fact existed and been implemented so far. the only problem is, more significant improvements are needed to fill the weaknesses of indonesian defense diplomacy through a strategy of deterrence.

The points of the strategy can be classified into 10 points of deterrence strategy. the ten points of the deterrence strategy are: (1) equating perceptions in dealing with conflicts in the north natuna sea. (2) increasing ownership of defense equipment. (3) applying the principle of anti-aggression territory. (4) implementing a bilateral strategy. (5) implementing a non-bilateral strategy. (6) increasing professionalism in various devices/ elements. (7) conduct joint military exercises. (8) increasing surveillance and joint patrols. (9) increase the discussion of maritime issues in regional and international forums. (10) increasing advocacy for the law of the sea.

Efforts To Improve Indonesia's Defense Diplomacy In The North Natuna Sea Through A Strategy Of Deterrence.

the research theme of improving the performance of defense diplomacy through deterrence strategies cannot be separated from the theory of national defense. state defense or national security or national defense is defined as articulating a strategy to compete, deter opponents, and win in a defined environment (usa defense strategy, 2018). narrowly, the meaning of national defense is limited to the military aspect. meanwhile, in a broad sense, national defense does not only cover traditional military issues, but also political, social and economic issues that can pose a threat to the state.

weaknesses in indonesia's defense diplomacy and deterrence strategy in the north natuna sea, based on the results of research carrying 10 points of deterrence strategy, are theoretically in accordance with the views of cottey and forster (2004). the ten points of deterrence strategy that can improve the performance of defense diplomacy are:

1. equalizing perceptions in dealing with conflicts in the north natuna sea. equal perception among stakeholders, especially stakeholders in the government that in dealing with threats in the north natuna sea it is not enough to just hand over the affairs to the ministry of defense. a prevention strategy is needed that is formulated and implemented together, and carried out in an integrated and sustainable manner.
2. increase the ownership of defense equipment, the most urgent defense equipment, especially patrol boats but with a large tonnage size, and a large number of ships so that they can patrol 200 miles from the coast of natuna island.

3. applying the principle of anti-aggression territory. ri must be able to work together with all international powers to make the north natuna sea region in particular and the south china sea area in general a peaceful international area, which facilitates world sea transportation.
4. implementing a bilateral strategy. bilateral strategy; ri should not only work with non-chinese countries, but also with china itself, so that mutual interests are created between ri and china, for example in the fields of investment and trade. this bilateral cooperation can prevent open conflict between indonesia and china in the north natuna sea
5. implementing a non-bilateral strategy. this non-bilateral strategy is similar to what is currently being done by indonesia, namely by continuing to carry out regional and international cooperation.
6. increasing professionalism in various devices/elements. professionalism must be increased in all elements, both military elements and non-military elements. non-military personnel that must be increased include fishermen's groups, to personnel who have been conducting patrols. trained fishermen who can sail the open seas up to 200 miles are urgently needed at this time.
7. conduct joint military exercises. joint military exercises in the north natuna sea must continue to be carried out with many countries, including china itself.
8. increasing surveillance and joint patrols. joint patrols can be carried out, for example between the tni-al and the ministry of maritime affairs. proposals for patrols using drones to be efficient and effective also need to be considered.
9. increase the discussion of maritime issues in regional and international forums. discussion of this maritime issue must continue to be echoed in various international forums, so that gradually there is an increasing understanding among many countries.

increasing advocacy for the law of the sea. law of the sea advocacy must continue. for example, conducting studies with the philippines, which has experience winning international courts when it comes to their territorial border disputes with china.

CONCLUSION

Based on the research results, it can be concluded as follows:

1. The performance of Indonesia's defense diplomacy in the North Natuna Sea for the 2016-2021 period is still relatively weak, especially if it is connected with potential threats from China. Weaknesses in Indonesia's defense diplomacy show that the North Natuna Sea is relatively not well guarded, so that foreign patrol boats are still freely in and out of the waters 200 miles from the North Natuna Sea. Against these foreign ships, RI was only able to issue a protest note through diplomatic channels, but RI was unable to make adequate deterrence, which could prevent these foreign ships from daring to enter the waters of the North Natuna Sea. The weakness of Indonesia's defense diplomacy in the North Natuna Sea is evident from the very minimal presence of government (non-military) ships, namely the Bakamla and PSDKP ships in the North Natuna Sea. This is inversely proportional to the presence of Chinese patrol boats that come in full force, so that they seem to dominate the North Natuna Sea in particular and the South China Sea in general.
2. Indonesia's strategy of deterrence in the North Natuna Sea for the 2016-2021 period has so far been carried out with external policies, namely collaborating with foreign parties, both bilaterally, regionally and globally/internationally. This external cooperation is not only in

the military field, but also in the non-military field. Another deterrence strategy is to show RI's presence in the North Natuna Sea, both the presence of sea patrols, to military exercises. Indonesia also chose a strategy of deterrence and defense diplomacy through international law. However, Indonesia has not yet brought the maritime border dispute with China in the North Natuna Sea to an international court or international arbitration institution as has been done by the Philippines.

Indonesia's efforts to increase defense diplomacy in the North Natuna Sea through a strategy of deterrence in the 2016-2021 period have been carried out with at least 10 points of deterrence strategy. The ten deterrence strategies are: (i) Equalizing perceptions in dealing with conflicts in the North Natuna Sea; (ii) Increasing the ownership of defense equipment, (iii) Applying the principle of anti-aggression areas; (iv) Implementing a bilateral strategy; (v) Implement a non-bilateral strategy; (vi) Increasing professionalism in various tools/ elements; (vii) Conduct joint military exercises; (viii) Increasing surveillance and joint patrols; (ix) Increase the discussion of maritime issues in regional and international forums; and (x) Increasing advocacy for the law of the sea. However, the sources acknowledged that these efforts were still not optimal, so they still needed to be improved

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