Analysis of the Operational Application of Military Capabilities in Counterinsurgency within a Military Operations Other than War Framework in the Papua Region

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Abstract
The military plays a key role in Indonesia's fight against armed separatist -insurgent groups. Not only that is it mandated by law, the military's involvement in counterinsurgency is also necessitated by practical demands and the nature of the conflict where separatist insurgents would often utilize guerilla warfare attacks such as exploitation of terrain to ambush security force positions. Other than the ability to inflict lethal force, the military also possess "soft" capabilities needed to win hearts & minds and facilitate the implementation of government policies. This study aims to analyze the operational application of military capabilities in counterinsurgency within an MOOTW framework in Papua. This article utilized a qualitative research design with a deductive analysis method where the researcher seeks to deductively analyze the data collected by understanding and studying theories from various literatures related to the research topic and then critically analyzing the data to answer the research questions as it pertains to the utilization Indonesia's military capabilities as means within an operational plan to implement the counterinsurgency strategy, as well as the challenges in conducting such operations & the relative limitations of the capabilities of the Indonesian military that can be utilized. The results of this study found that the military capabilities are applied in territorial, intelligence, and combat/ enforcement operations. The challenges to the operational application include lack of cultural competence, actionable intelligence, unified command, as well as suitable metrics. In conclusion, the military supports the implementation of government policy in Papua via territorial, intelligence, and combat/ enforcement operations with significant impediments including lack of intelligence, cultural/ linguistic competence, metrics, and a unified command. To improve this, the military needs to provide cultural/ linguistic training, enable point persistent surveillance, stand up a unified structure to coordinate intelligence, and implement viable metrics to assess progress.

Keywords: Operations, Capabilities, Counterinsurgency, MOOTW

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian military has a long history of involvement in countering insurgencies and separatist movements throughout the Indonesian archipelago with relatively high rates of success. These insurgent movements range from religiously motivated insurgencies such as the DI/TII (Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia) and MIT (*Mujahid Indonesia Timur*), nationalist revolutionaries such as the PRRI & PERMESTA, to separatist insurgencies organized along ethnic-regional groups such as the FRETILIN-FALINTIL (F*rente Revolucionária de Timor Leste Independente*), RMS (*Republik Maluku Selatan*) as well as OPM/TPNPB (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka/ Tentara Pembebasan Nasional Papua Barat*) (J.S Prabowo, 2012).
The military is utilized in a counterguerrilla capacity with a purpose to degrade the separatist insurgent's military capacity, resulting in military defeat for the insurgents and cessation of fighting. However, the advent of globalized media and communications technology have significantly impacted the conduct of military operations in counterinsurgency for the Indonesian military where several formerly effective counterinsurgency techniques were no longer acceptable since it can result in the violation of human rights and deaths or collateral damage (Kilcullen, 2010).

Despite being relatively restrained and utilizing measures that are not particularly harsh by historical standards, the Indonesian military failed to win the perception management campaign particularly against the FRETILIN which resulted in the secession of East Timor

(Kilcullen, 2010, p. 103). This demonstrates that there is a stark contrast between the application of military force in counterinsurgency prior to and after globalization, especially with the advent of proliferation of communications technology.

Currently, Indonesia is dealing with the Papuan separatist movement which is often called the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka). The movement itself is typical of any insurgent movement in which it is comprised of a political faction/ wing (i.e. KNPB, WPNA, WPNLC, and ULMWP) and a military/ paramilitary wing which is generally called the TPNPB or armed OPM (some factions of the military wing call themselves TRWP/TRPB) (IPAC, 2015). Singh (2008) elaborated that the grievances that are the impetus of the conflict can be articulated as the following: 1) objection of the 1969 Pepera results, 2) inhuman treatment and violations of human rights of indigenous Papuans, and 3) the development issues and abject poverty suffered by Papuans despite of the region's immense exploitable natural wealth (p.112-113).
Globalization and democratization have shifted the Indonesian government's military centric policy in dealing with insurgencies. Currently the government maintains two sets of approaches when dealing with Papuan issues that are articulated in the Presidential Instruction Number 9/ 2020 (*Instruksi Presiden Nomor 9 Tahun 2020 tentang Percepatan Pembangunan Kesejahteraan di Provinsi Papua dan Papua Barat*) (Kemenkopolhukam, 2021). The first approach of the policy directive in the document instructs that Papuan issues are dealt with an emphasis on welfare through comprehensive and multidimensional development initiatives (Kemenkopolhukam, 2021). The second policy approach pertains to security and enforcement of state laws in order to; 1) eliminate and arrest the perpetrators of armed criminal activities, 2) safeguard the community and critical infrastructure, 3) prevent and prosecute the misuse and corruption of the allocated state (provincial) budget (Kemenkopolhukam, 2021).

Despite of the fact that the Indonesian military can legally be involved in countering armed insurgency (which in this case is a separatist insurgency), there seems to be a confusion on behalf of the government's civilian leadership in assigning suitable roles for the military to contribute in. First this confusion stems from the perception that the military is only adept at conducting high intensity combat operations involving large numbers of troops and materiel which requires legal mandate from the government in designating a particular area as *a Daerah Operasi Militer*, or military operations area where the military can legally conduct high intensity military operations (DPR RI, 2023). This designation has sparked controversy since it can result in significant civilian deaths, human rights violations, and destruction of infrastructure as occurred in past military counterinsurgency campaigns most notably in Aceh and East Timor (DPR RI, 2023). The second confusion relates to the designation of the armed groups conducting limited guerilla warfare in the region (Papua). The government insists on the use of the term KKB/ *kelompok kriminal bersenjata* or armed criminal group(s) which implies an emphasis on the use of law enforcement to counter and eradicate the separatist insurgents. However, law enforcement often lack capabilities required to conduct counter-guerilla operations such as combat and terrain intelligence, air mobility, and combat tracking that can be utilized to find, fix, and finish the guerillas in a discriminate fashion, thus requiring assitance from the military (Prabowo, 2013, & Karnavian, 2017).

There have been several recent researches in regards to the topic of counterinsurgency operations in Papua. The first recent research is by Kusumah (2022) which delved into the strategy of intelligence operations conducted within the context of countering Papuan insurgents. The research elaborated that the conduct of intelligence in countering Papuan insurgents is conducted by various taskforces/ *satgas* which are often operating alone without any deconfliction or little coordination resulting in duplication of reports and sources. Other than lack of coordination, hindrances to effective intelligence operations found in the research also include lack of specialized intelligence gathering equipment, insufficient training and continuity of

operations that allow phasing and familiarization with the operational targets, and accurate measurements of progress or metrics. The second research is by Aribowo (2022) that elaborated that military's strategy in countering the Papuan insurgency is rested upon three main operational activities namely territorial operations as the main effort/ operation to win hearts & minds and to aid in the implementation of gov't policies and programs, supported by intelligence and combat operations to influence Papuans (including regular civilians, reconcilable, and irreconcilable insurgents), and combat operations (both offensive and defensive operations) against irreconcilable elements of the insurgency. Both have identified challenges or constraints to COIN operations in Papua namely lack of coordination between security agencies and the military, lack of familiarity with the demography and geography, and primordialism/ tribalism that protects the separatists to an extent.

Although both researches mention several specific solutions which includes the provision of a unified C2 structure, small unit force structure to maximize lethality and survivability, and adequate intelligence and collection equipment required, both researches did not specify crucial aspects such as pre-deployment training (particularly the inclusion of a language and cultural training), the setting of preconditions allowing the collection of actionable intelligence, and the articulation of specific metrics that could be implemented to measure progress.

Therefore, due to the critical role of the military in counterinsurgency, this article seeks to elaborate on how Indonesia's military capabilities are utilized as means within an operational plan to implement the counterinsurgency strategy that directly counters the insurgent's actions. In addition, the researcher would also like to analyze the challenges in conducting of such operations, and the relative limitations of the capabilities of the Indonesian military that can be utilized, as well as provide recommendation for actions that can be implemented to ameliorate the situation.

RESEARCH METHODS

This study uses a qualitative research method where the researcher seeks to deductively identify general best practices that can be applicable in specific cases concerning the theory of insurgency and counterinsurgency strategies as well as the operational design to implement the strategy. The literature and documents related to the research obtained from various references and sources were analyzed using a deductive data analysis method. As mentioned by Bingham & Witkowsky in Vanover et al. (2022), deductive data analysis is a data analysis method that analyzes data by formulating a hypothesis from existing theories and literature which is then used to test the available data regarding specific cases. The deductive data analysis method is used in this article to first describe the strategy and operational concepts currently in place to counter the insurgent adversary, and secondly, to recommend actions to address challenges present during the operational application of military capabilities to counter the separatist insurgency in Papua.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Current Government Strategy and the Military's Role and Involvement through the OMSP Framework

Strategy, as defined by Lykke (1989) consists of ends, ways, and means. The Indonesian military is an important instrument that is utilized in a concerted effort to counter the Papuan separatist insurgent's strategy. According to *Instruksi Presiden Nomor 9 Tahun 2020*, TNI's role in supporting the implementation of the government's policy as it pertains to Papua are;

1   To provide security in support of the implementation of welfare and economic development policies in Papua.
2   To support local governments in providing basic services such as education and health services in remote, interior areas, state borders, and small islands and remote indigenous communities,
3   And, to build inclusive social communication with religious leaders, traditional leaders, community leaders, community organizations and Papuan grass roots groups in order to implement suitable development policies and approaches.

Within this policy framework, the military is used to help provide security and stability, support policies and the implementation of basic government services, and build social communication with relevant parties. This is in accordance to Gray (2010) that states that the use of the military to support government policy objectives, which in this case the TNI is involved to create strategic effects, namely: a safe and stable situation from security disturbances caused by the activities of the Papuan armed separatists, support the implementation of government policies (including facilitation gov't administration and provision of basic services), as well as to affect community acceptance and support for the presence of government and security forces.

The deployment of military power requires its own strategy or direction of use which is in line with the grand strategic design (the direction and use of all instruments of national power). In its implementation, military strategy is implemented in the form of operations carried out through tactical actions. Military power influences (supports/does not support) the achievement of policy through the effects or impacts it causes. The strategy is implemented through operations and tactical actions in the field based on specific doctrines of the use of military force (Gray, 2010, p. 17). It is hoped that the operations and tactical actions conducted will produce tactical and operational effects that will have affect the desired strategic effects and consequences, which will then have an impact on the achievement of political/policy goals. In the context of counter separatism in the Papua region, TNI conducts several functions (operations) to create strategic effects that can support the implementation of government policies.

First, TNI conducts territorial operations through three key activities namely *komunikasi sosial*/ social communication*, Bhakti TNI,* and *ketahanan wilayah*. These activities are conducted to facilitate basic regional government services and build inclusive communication with community leaders, traditional and religious leaders. Second, the TNI conducts intelligence operations which consists of three main functions which are *penyelidikan* or investigative functions (to find out the disposition, composition, intentions and plans of the enemy), *pengamanan*/ security, and *penggalangan*/ influence activities especially on the community (particularly native Papuans), youth groups, and active separatists to side with the government. Third, protecting the community from acts of violence perpetrated by separatists, as well as conducting direct action against armed separatist groups within the framework of police assistance (*perbantuan kepada kepolisian*)

The capabilities required for these operations are;

1   Combat capabilities, to conduct attrition against the separatist group's (limited) combat capabilities in a discriminate manner.
2   Intelligence capabilities to obtain situational awareness regarding the enemy, human terrain/population (which is the critical terrain) and physical-geographical terrain.
3   Territorial capabilities to carry out social communication (*komunikasi sosial*), build relationships/rapport with local communities, and support the implementation of government policies in the area.
4   Support capabilities including diplomacy & command and control. Diplomacy capabilities can be utilized to inform the domestic and international stakeholders of the progress of ongoing operations, military operations, as well as to counter any

narrative/propaganda spread by separatist intelligence agents. Command and control capabilities enables the unification of effort by different units/ taskforces so that they are in line/ support the commander's intent and the government's overall counterinsurgency effort.

Although the military engagement strategy has been designed quite well, there are several limitations to the use of military power, namely, the military can only be used to create a safe and stable situation that facilitates the implementation of government policies. Because the center of gravity in counterinsurgency relates to the legitimacy of the government as well as the population's attitudes towards it, the capabilities possessed by the military (TNI) and the security apparatus as a whole can only facilitate a situation where government policies can be implemented effectively. Most of the efforts to win the hearts and minds of the population as well as to address the root cause of the problems and reconcile with marginalized indigenous groups can only be conducted effectively through effective government policy and politics.

The implementation of military strategy must also consider efforts that separatists can take to thwart the government's counterinsurgency efforts. In the political domain, Papuan separatist political factions can mobilize the masses and use their reach and influence to create "emergency zones" and escalation of human rights violations resulting from the instability that attracts international attention that can trigger international intervention. Meanwhile in the armed front, armed separatists can increase the frequency of attacks, particularly against pro-government civilians and government workers, which can hinder the implementation of government policies due to the increased intensity of violence. In addition, armed separatist groups may exploit ethnic/tribal relations and kinship to provoke security forces to indiscriminately target and arrest civillians, resulting in increased public hostility towards the security forces and the Indonesian government.

The military strategy is implemented through the conduct of operational activities that utilize military capabilities as mentioned above. These operational activities conducted by the TNI can be categorized into three forms of operations namely; territorial operations, intelligence activities, as well as direct action (*penindakan*). These operational activities are conducted with the purpose of facilitating the implementation of government policy and basic services, win hearts and minds, as well as to maintain security and conduct direct action operations against the armed separatist insurgents.

Territorial Operations

Territorial operations are conducted through three key activities namelyy social communication, *bhakti TNI*, and regional resiliency programs or *ketahanan wilayah*. These activities are mainly conducted by TNI territorial substructures (such *as Korem, Kodim*, and *Koramil)* and non-organic task forces deployed in the region on a periodic basis. There are several purposes of conducting territorial operations;

1. to build and maintain rapport with community leaders, as well as tribal chiefs (*ondopolo/ ondoafi*) and religious leaders (primarily via "social communication")
2. to address basic community issues particularly as it pertains to welfare by providing assistance in areas such as healthcare, education, and agriculture (primarily conducted through *Bhakti TNI* and *Ketahanan Wilayah* programs).

Perhaps the most common and easiest program to implement is the "social communication" initiatives conducted by non-organic unit taskforces and territorial subcommands. These activities are usually conducted to build rapport with village/ tribal chiefs, through planned/ incidental visits, patrols, or other more targeted programs. There are several examples of territorial activities conducted both by TNI regional territorial sub commands as well task forces comprised of non-organic units.

Territorial activities conducted by non-organic taskforces can be seen in the social communication activity conducted by infantry battalion (Yonif) 143/ TWEJ from Lampung where they conducted *komunikasi sosial* with the head of the village and also the local *Ondoapi* or tribal leader of Yamrab II Village in Web District/ Keerom regency (Penerangan Kodam XVII Cendrawasih, 2023). Other examples of *komunikasi sosial* include planned meetings and programs conducted by the Koramil via the *Babinsa* (*Bintara Pembina Desa*/ Village level military official) in which the *Babinsa* and the local village/ tribal chief discuss matter pertaining to community security (*siskamling*) and agricultural issues. An example of this can be seen in the komunikasi sosial programs conducted by Babinsa's from Koramil 1710-03 and Koramil 1701-14 where they met with the tribal chief of their respective locales to be updated with information on community security matters, as well as to assist local farmers/ crop growers on rice cultivation techniques (Penerangan Kodam XVII Cendrawasih, 2023).

Other than "social communication" activities, other territorial operational activities include *bhakti TNI* programs. These programs are often more centralized in their planning and implementation for example TNI HQ's *Program Prioritas Nasional Bakti Papua*. This program is part of the Military Operations Other Than War (OMSP) conducted by TNI Headquarters to help the community, especially in efforts to accelerate, improve, and recover the economy as well as supporting the government's National Economic Recovery (*Pemulihan Ekonomi Nasional*/ PEN) program in several of TNI regional commands in the Papua region. This territorial activity is also a form of TNI Darma Bakti to assist the government in addressing community problems (TNI AD, 2023).

The program is planned to be conducted on a continual basis throughout various regions in Papua by organic/ non-organic units deployed in the area, especially in the 10 territorial development areas (*Wilayah Pembinaan Teritorial*). The program is developed to address issues in accordance to area typology with a purpose to cultivate community resilience in human development, education, agriculture, and health sectors. The targeted areas and implementing units are; infantry battalion (Yonif) PR 433/JS in the Mapenduma area of Nduga Regency, Yonif MR 411/PDW in the Kenyam area of Nduga Regency, Yonif 7 Marines in the area of Yahukimo Regency, Yonif PR 330/PRA in the Sugapa area of Intan Jaya Regency, Yonif R 300/BJW in the Ilaga area of Puncak Regency, Yonif 721/MAKKASAU in the Lanny Jaya Regency area, Yonif 631 in the Mimika Regency area, Yonif 310/KK in the Pegubin Regency area, Yonif 623/BWU in the Maybrat Regency area, and Yonif 133/YS in Maybrat Regency area. Apart from these ten areas, the program was also held in Nayaro Village and Banti Village, Mimika Baru District (Puspen TNI, 2023).

Success in territorial operations hinge on the territorial personnel's familiarity and understanding of the geography, demography, and social conditions of the community that enables them to implement/ conduct programs that appropriately accommodate critical issues and the needs of the community. Familiarization with the operating environment can only be done effectively through direct interaction with the community and important figureheads (for example: tribal/ village chiefs, and religious & community leaders).

In addition, effective implementation of territorial operational activities is also influenced by the relative success of intelligence and combat (*penindakan*) & security operations. In volatile areas, intelligence influence operations can help mobilize the community and its leaders (*ondoafi/ondopolo*) to support the presence of the government (and the TNI), as well as provide information regarding supporters and active members of separatist groups so that their plans and intentions can be anticipated. Security and offensive (*penindakan*) operations support territorial efforts by securing the community and infrastructure, and eliminating separatist armed groups directly, affecting the security and stability of areas where territorial operations are being carried out.

The relative difficulty in conducting territorial operations are influenced directly by the relative level of violence in a particular area. The Papua region is extremely volatile and that armed violence is still a common occurrence. Pangdam XVII/Cendrawasih have classified several areas (regencies) as *rawan* or vulnerable namely: Nduga, Yahukimo, and Pegunungan Bintang which are situated in the Papua Pegunungan province, and Puncak and Intan Jaya regencies in Papua Tengah province. Thus, efforts to conduct territorial operational activities in these areas require higher security presence than territorial activities in other more secure areas.

Intelligence activities

The second type of operational activity that involves the use of military capabilities is intelligence. Intelligence operational activities include *penyelidikan* or investigative functions (to find out the disposition, composition, intentions and plans of the enemy), *pengamanan*/ operational security, and *penggalangan*/ overt and covert influence activities especially targeted towards tribal chiefs, religious leaders, the native Papuan community, and the separatists themselves to support/side with the government or act in ways that are advantageous for the government's interests.

In Papua, intelligence operational activities are conducted by various government agencies and organizations which includes law enforcement (POLRI/POLDA) and state intelligence (BIN). Intelligence activities conducted by the military are primarily conducted by regional military intelligence (*intelijen kewilayahan*) under KODAM XVII Cenderawasih and KODAM XVIII Kasuari, as well as non-organic taskforces primarily from the military's strategic intelligence agency or BAIS and various intelligence taskfroces from the Army special forces (i.e. Kopassus).

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First, the TNI conducts the investigative function of intelligence (*penyelidikan*) through collection of HUMINT/Human Intelligence, by forming networks of informants supported by the use of specialized intelligence equipment, particularly equipment capable of performing aerial observations and communication interception. This intelligence function is conducted to decipher enemy plans and intentions (particularly plans on conducting attacks/ activities with significant political/ military effects). Investigative functions to collect intelligence is also conducted to develop an intelligence picture of the social conditions/dynamics in particular areas/ communities within Papua that have operational implications. In addition, intelligence investigative functions are also conducted to uncover the clandestine/closed network of Papuan separatists and their support infrastructure within and outside the country, which includes individuals and groups/organizations.

Secondly, intelligence security functions conducted by the TNI in Papua emphasizes on preventing or thwarting enemy intelligence collection and sabotage operations. The purpose is to protect TNI units, operations, and confidential information from adversarial enemy activity. The scope of security includes protection of personnel, material and of operational activities.

Thirdly, intelligence influence activities (penggalangan)is conducted to affect changes in the target's predilections to set up particular conditions that aids government efforts, which in this case is to deny the enemy of popular support whilst gaining said support for the Indonesian government's side, as well as to influence the enemy directly so that they cease to pursue their ideological cause (separatist ideology/ Papuan independence). The targets of influence operations in Papua can be categorized into four namely; indigenous Papuans (Orang Asli Papua/ OAP),

community (tribal/religious) leaders, youth groups, and active separatists (both from the political and armed fronts).

The challenges related to the conduct of intelligence activities vary. First, lack of integrated command & control resulting in the duplication of operational targets, efforts, or duplication of information and/ or sources that can result in inefficiency and recurrence of outdated information (Kusumah, 2022). Second, lack of sufficient intelligence equipment (communication interceptors, aerial and ground surveillance equipment, etc). Third, lack of understanding of the nature and behavior of indigenous Papuans by TNI intelligence personnel. In addition, local language and cultural competencies among intelligence personnel seem to not be optimal. Fourth, Particular actions and attitudes by TNI intelligence officers in Papua that are neither able to sufficiently build rapport with the Ondoafi/Ondopolo nor the traditional structure of the indigenous Papuans to allow them to leverage such relationships when conducting their intelligence functions. The patterns of attitudes and actions of security forces (particularly non-organic taskforces) in the area can cause antipathy and rejection, resulting in locals resisting and threatening the safety of the security forces. Fifth, the influence effort by TNI intelligence targeting members of the armed groups of the Papuan separatists haven't yet been organized sufficiently as to enable phasing and continuit. Sixth, operational efforts by TNI are often complicated by the inherent xenophobia and suspicion towards pendatang by local/ indigenous Papuans, particularly the one's inhabiting isolated communities in rough/ rugged terrain (Kusumah, 2022)

Combat Operations or direct action are activities done by either police paramilitary units (Brimob) and military elements either attached to law enforcement taskforces (e.g. *Satgas Damai Cartenz/* formerly *Satgas Nemangkawi*) or are military task forces (*Satgas Pamtas, Tim Nanggala, Satgas Mandala, Satgas Pamrahwan*) that utilize lethal force to kill/capture insurgent's armed groups. These are mainly conducted either through proactive or reactive contact. Proactive contact involves detecting ongoing or planned enemy activity. After confirming enemy whereabouts, taskforces capable of inflicting lethal force are tasked to patrol to the designated area to either ambush or raid a particular separatist insurgent location. Reactive contacts are primarily initiated by the armed separatists against patrolling law enforcement/ military units, as well as static military and law enforcement posts. Reactive contacts generally are advantageous for the separatists and enable them to inflict significant casualties on TNI and local Papuan law enforcement.

Lately the separatists have also utilized novel tactics by deliberately causing incidents (such as the burning of public infrastructure e.g. schools, *puskesmas*/ public clinics, etc) to lure security forces into the open where they then can ambush. This tactic has resulted in significant casualties from security forces e.g. the death of Major General (Anumerta) IGP Danny Nugraha Karya (the provincial intelligence chief/ Kabinda) in 2021 (Kompas, 2021). *Penindakan* involves small units i.e. squad, platoon, or company sized elements comprising of military, paramilitary law enforcement, or a combination of both. The military are often utilized to assist law enforcement in pursuit operations, particularly when law enforcement personnel lack firepower and capabilities in traversing rough inhospitable terrain that often provides key advantage for the separatists who are often familiar with the terrain features and the area.

There are several challenges to effective *Penindakan* operations. These include as the following: First, the terrain and geography, as well as the unpredictability of harsh weather conditions. These factors have greatly impacted the conduct of patrols. In addition, the enemy have better rate of adaptation to the environment than the security forces due to being natives of the area (Aribowo, 2022). Another challenge to effective *penindakan* operations relates to the kinship/ tribal relations of the armed separatists that would often be given "protection" by kin members/ tribal chiefs, especially when the armed separatists are from the same tribal/ethnic

group. This impediment is exacerbated by lack of actionable intelligence and persistent surveillance that not only tracks enemy whereabouts, plans & intentions, but also the enemy's relation towards the populace/ attitude of the populace towards the enemy and the security forces (Aribowo, 2022).

Apart from geographic and demographic constraints that affects discriminate targeting against armed separatist elements, efforts by the military to proactively act against armed separatists have also been hampered by the framework in which the military is utilized to provide assistance to law enforcement where they are often deployed reactively in pursuit of armed separatist elements. This allows the armed separatists to have the initiative that enables them to deliberately lure security forces into the open where they are prone to ambush (Aribowo, 2022). Influx of illegal weapons into Papua both from international and domestic sources, as well as significant number of weapons taken from ambushed security force personnel have significantly increased the firepower of separatist armed groups (AIDP, 2022). This has increased the lethality and frequency of attacks by the separatists (Martinkus, 2020, p. 44).

L   astly, indicators of operational success in *penindakan* operations still utilize outdated paradigms in which effectiveness indicators of operations are still based on numbers of enemies killed (body count) and weapons recovered (Kusumah, 2022, p. 72). As Kilcullen (2010) mentioned, body count metrics alone might not necessarily provide an indication of the degradation/ weakening of the enemy force (p. 57).

Solutions to address challenges in Operational Application of Military Capabilities in Counterinsurgency within *Operasi Militer Selain Perang* Framework in the Papua Region
Cultural Understanding and Local Language Training

First, related to the lack of cultural and linguistic competencies of non-organic security forces deployed in the region, it would be suitable to include a standardized program that teaches students the cultural behaviors and the basic local language spoken in their area of operations. The program must also include roleplaying where students will perform scenarios that they most likely face during deployment (preferably real scenarios that have happened in past deployments of their sister units). In Papua, there are several dozen cultural as well as language groups. As mentioned by Pangdam XVII Cenderawasih, there are currently 5 *daerah rawan* or volatile areas in Papua namely Nduga, Yahukimo, and Pegunungan Bintang which are situated in the Papua Pegunungan province, and Puncak and Intan Jaya regencies in Papua Tengah province. Each of these areas have its distinct culture and languages spoken on a regular basis by the indigenous population. The provinces of Papua Pegunungan and Papua Tengah are situated in the Mee-Pago and La-Pago cultural areas. The cultural groups native of these territories include; Biksi, Dani, Eipomek, Hupla, Momuna, Nduga, Ngalum, Nggem, Auye, Damal, Mee, Ekari, Moni, Tarunggare, Tause, Turu, and Wolani cultural groups (Singh, 2008, p. 42-43). The local languages spoken include Kamandoga (Ekari and Moni languages), Dani, Damal, Kosarek, Nalca, Sirkai, and Nduga languages (Singh, 2008, p. 44-46)

During the pre-deployment training (*latihan pratugas*), the units (generally infantry battalions) hone three main capabilities namely territorial, intelligence, and combat since the troops are required to not only be competent in the application of lethal force but also to engage in dialogue and "hearts and minds" campaigns (Kompas, 2023). Dialogue and "hearts and minds" campaigns requires them to be able to establish communication with locals that often use local languages (not Indonesian) in their daily lives. Although there has been an initiative by unit commanders to incorporate such realism into their training with scenarios and local language training (such as the pre-deployment training of Yonif Para Raider 305/ Tengkorak designed by its commander Lt. Col. Ardiansyah), pre-deployment training incorporating a standardized curriculum of real-life scenarios and basic cultural/ local language training hasn't yet been incorporated throughout the force (Yonif Pararaider 305, 2023).

Cultural understanding and (local) language training is crucial for effective counterinsurgency because 1) it allows the operational units to discern cultural subtleties that have ramifications for the counterinsurgency effort, 2) to understand local political/ tribal dynamics that can be utilized to support the counterinsurgent's side, 3) It enables the counterinsurgent force to understand the definition of normalcy within the area of operations, preventing the counterinsurgent force to react recklessly (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 30-33).

Unified command in intelligence

Intelligence plays an increased role in counterinsurgency and the effectiveness of a counterinsurgency campaign hinges on the ability of the counterinsurgent force to generate and act on quality intelligence (Kilcullen, 2010). One of the main challenges to effective intelligence operations in support of counter separatist operations in Papua identified by Kusumah (2022) is the lack of a unified command that coordinates and deconflicts intelligence activities whilst preventing duplication of effort by the various organizations engaged in intelligence activities in Papua. Kusumah (2022) proposed a *komando & pengendalian/satuan tugas intelijen gabungan* or a combined intelligence taskforce command and control led by the state intelligence agency or BIN. BIN (state intelligence agency) acts as the principal that coordinates the operations conducted by various intelligence taskforces conducted by the military (TNI), law enforcement as well as the regional state intelligence office or *Badan Intelijen Daerah* (BINDA).

Kusumah (2022) elaborated that the purpose of this command and control structure is to enable the following conditions : 1) to maximize the command & control and the coordination of operations, 2) to optimize the synchronization and synergy with Papuan community elements including tribal, religious, and government leaders, 3) to optimize intelligence influence operations (*penggalangan*) and ensure operational continuity, 4) to integrate collected data and information into a unified database that can be utilized to inform the decisions of leaders and commanders, 5) to enable evaluation and analysis of data to further refine the data and information obtained in the future, 6) to eliminate or minimize interservice rivalry detrimental to the success of intelligence operations (p. 87-89).

Actionable Intelligence to Pre-empt/ Cut Off Enemy Actions and Logistics

The armed separatists would often exploit surprise and positional superiority to inflict casualties, especially among security forces (military and law enforcement). The main method of attack utilized by armed separatists is to ambush security force positions, either on static posts or on *penindakan* elements that are pursuing them by utilizing positional superiority (Seskoad, 2020, p. 23-24). This allows the insurgents to have the initiative while positioning the TNI and POLRI elements reacting to their actions. Prior to attack/ ambush, the separatists would often reconnoiter TNI/ POLRI positions by using sympathizers/ watchers to inform them of the strength and also routine of TNI/POLRI personnel (Seskoad, 2020). After the information requirements are sufficient, armed separatist elements would attack in bands and after the initial engagement they would often retreat (and in many cases, crossing the border into Papua New Guinea to avoid Indonesian government reach) (Seskoad, 2020, p. 24).

Thus, there is a need to develop a way of generating actionable intelligence that is needed by low level tactical units enabling them to pre-empt the enemy's actions. Hall & Citrenbaum (2012) mentioned that in irregular conflicts such as counterinsurgency, the adversary is incredibly adept at using his surroundings to hide, blending his activities within the environment and the normalcy of the daily lives of the regular population in order to carry out his intent (p. 93). This makes it difficult for the counterinsurgents to discern the adversary's intentions and condition setting, i.e. noticeable events that indicate the implementation of enemy plans (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2012).

To be able to discern the adversary's plans and intentions, the counterinsurgent must develop point persistent surveillance (P^2S) which is defined as the ability to continuously sense

key indicators of enemy activity/ presence on the ground, air, space, water, or cyberspace accurately at specific points at the right time, utilizing a combination of sensors (including technical and human sensors) (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2012, p. 316). P²S capabilities needs to be accessible to low level tactical commanders (i.e. battalion, company, and platoon size elements) and must sufficiently satisfy their requirements for information (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2012, p. 326). This is important because the low-level tactical units bear the brunt in counterinsurgency (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2012).

P²S capability allows the counterinsurgent to gain situational awareness that enables detection of anomalies or early indications of potential enemy activities. Hall & Citrenbaum (2012) elaborated on the factors that make P²ISR possible. First, there must be a defined intelligence requirements that's useful for tactical units. These requirements are then converted into "observables" or visible indications of enemy activities. Secondly, the use of multiple sensors/ assets (which includes aerial/ airborne surveillance, small concealable ground MASINT devices, human intelligence (HUMINT), open source, as well as signals/ communication interceptors) to detect observable indications of enemy activity. The intelligence collection planner must first determine the feasibility of the collection platforms/ sensors in collecting against P²SIR observables. Third, availability of sensors that can provide continuous focus so that observation can be done at the right place and the right time, on the right activity and the right observables (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2012, p. 319). Fourth, unity of effort and a command & control structure sufficient to synchronize sensors (including various intelligence organizations) so that it complements each other (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2012, p. 318).

P²S requires extensive use of sensors which includes aerial observation/ airborne surveillance platforms, communications intercept equipment, ground MASINT devices, and other commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) surveillance equipment. In addition, there is also a need for human intelligence collection (available for the lowest tactical levels) comprising of low level HUMINT from the population to develop a baseline or pattern of life of the area (as departure from the normal can indicate anomalies), as well as tactical/ operational/ strategic HUMINT sources that can provide direct access to enemy plans & intentions which requires handling from trained HUMINT specialists/ case-officers (Hall & Citrenbaum, 2012).

Implementation of Metrics

As mentioned by Kusumah (2022), indicators of operational success in *penindakan* operations still utilize outdated paradigms in which effectiveness indicators are still based on the number of enemies killed (body count) and weapons recovered. As mentioned by Kilcullen (2010) body count alone might not necessarily provide a clear indication of the degradation/ weakening of the enemy force (p. 57). The following are recommended metrics proposed by Kilcullen (2010) and Prabowo (2013) that can be applied in this context, these include security force operation effectiveness metrics, enemy effectiveness/ lethality metrics, and population metrics.

The effectiveness of security force operations can be measured based on the win-loss ratio in each engagement, as well as the kill ratio against insurgents (kill ratio, ratio of wins to losses, ratio of kills to wounded/captures). It can also be assessed by their ability to capture insurgents during pursuit (Prabowo, 2013, p. 198). In regards to the metrics of the effectiveness of security forces, Kilcullen recommends metrics/indicators such as the ratio of mistaken arrests/shootings and the predictability of security forces. A high rate of mistaken arrests by security forces may indicate inaccurate intelligence or weak restraint/control of security forces, resulting in non-discriminatory arrests/shootings. Predictability metrics may indicate the vulnerability of a force, where the predictable behavior of the force can be accurately anticipated by insurgents, making them susceptible to attacks/ambushes (Kilcullen, 2010, p. 72).

In measuring enemy lethality or effectiveness, Prabowo (2013) mentioned that these can be assessed by the intensity of armed attacks, the acquisition of weapons and ammunition seized from security forces, and the number of attacks and armed violence directed towards civilians (p. 199). Kilcullen (2010) argues that the effectiveness of insurgent armed actions can be seen from the following indicators:

- The use of high technology inserts in attacks indicates the level of adaptability of the insurgents as well as the level of financial assistance that they can obtain.
- The health status of captured insurgents can indicate the level of morale and access to medicines and food.
- The origin of insurgents can indicate the level of support from the population and the motives behind armed violent actions.
- Ability to initiate armed contact indicates the insurgents' control over the operational environment and intelligence, where insurgents have the initiative in the attack.

Last, progress in counterinsurgency should be measured based on the degree of population support/ acquiescence. Prabowo (2013) mentioned that metrics related to population support should measure; the degree of active participation by community members on government-initiated projects/ programs, the common perception/ attitude towards those said programs, and the openness and courage of the local population to interact with security forces (p. 203). Kilcullen (2010) also recommends similar metrics/indicators where indications of population support can be measured based on the following indicators: voluntary reporting from the community about illegal activities (which includes but not limited to insurgent activities), prices of specific commodities (often influenced by ease of transportation and the security level of an area), the sustainability and continuity of development projects, and the level of participation of civilians in government programs (pp. 59-62).

CONCLUSION

The Indonesian military's involvement in countering the separatist insurgency in Papua is to enable security and stability, support the implementation of basic services, and to build rapport and win hearts & minds of the population. This is conducted through the operational application of various military capabilities namely territorial, intelligence, special operations, and offensive/ defensive combat which are implemented through territorial, intelligence, and *penindakan* operations to facilitate implementation of government policy, influence & secure the population, as well as degrade the enemy networks and support structure. However, there are several impediments to the operational application of the military capabilities. These impediments include: lack of supporting infrastructure particularly in interior mountainous areas, lack of cultural awareness and language competence of the security forces, a command structure to unify efforts particularly as it pertains to intelligence, lack of actionable intelligence to pre-empt enemy action and destroy his support infrastructure, as well as lack of suitable metrics providing indication of progress/ or lack thereof. The solutions prescribed by the writer include development of a unified command structure under the state intelligence agency to help coordinate and synchronize intelligence efforts, provision of useful metrics that track indicators of security force and enemy effectiveness, implementation of a pre-deployment training program that focuses on the development and real-world scenario application of cultural and language competence, and lastly, enabling point persistent surveillance through the provision of adequate sensors, defined intelligence requirements, unified intelligence command & control, and the "borrowing" of sensor time for the military.

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